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SUPREME RISK
Benjamin P. Edwards*
Abstract
While many have discussed the social issues that might arise because
of a majority-conservative Supreme Court, one critical consequence of
the current Court has been overlooked: the role of the Court in generating
or avoiding systemic risk. For some time, systemic financial risk has been
regulated by a mix of self-regulatory organizations (SROs), such as the
Depository Trust Corporation, and federal regulators such as the
Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC). However, the Court's
recent jurisprudence now creates real risk that federal courts will declare
keystone SROs unconstitutional because they do not fit neatly into an
eighteenth-century constitutional framework.
SROs are under-appreciated regulatory entities comprised of industry
members regulating their own industries with deferential oversight from
federal administrative agencies. While ordinary civics discussions
entirely omit SROs, they play critical legal and economic roles and
exercise expansive power delegated to them by the federal government.
Yet, as nominally private entities, they enforce federal law and their own
rules without abiding by the constitutional restrictions imposed on
governmental entities, such as providing due process.
This Article makes three contributions to the literatures in financial
regulation and constitutional law-disciplines that rarely interact. First,
it provides a detailed account of how SROs became functionally
integrated into the federal government and serve as federal law
enforcement and regulators. Second, it shows how four different
constitutional doctrines, now resurging under a majority-conservative
Supreme Court, pose existential threats to existing SRO models. Third,
this Article explains how Supreme Court decisions declaring SROs
unconstitutional or limiting their powers generate systemic risk and may
trigger a financial crisis as well as how possible measures can mitigate
this risk.

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, William S. Boyd School
of Law; Columbia Law School, J.D., Thanks to Stephani D. Christensen, Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Carliss Chatman, Nicole Iannarone, Cathy Hwang, James Fallows Tierney, Andrew Jennings,
Nancy B. Rapoport, Sarah Haan, Alexander I. Platt, Tom C.W. Lin, and others for helpful
comments on earlier versions of this Article. Any errors and omissions in this Article remain mine
alone.
543

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.

74

INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................... 545
I

SRO REGULATORY MODEL ............................ 553
The SRO Model and History .......................................... 553
Expansive SRO Powers to Enforce FederalLaw ........... 560
1. Enforcing Federal Law Without Presidential
C on tro l.....................................................................5 6 0
2. Controlling Access to Their Industries ................... 562
3. Limited Power Over Nonmembers ......................... 563
C. Variedand Lightly Supervised SRO
THE CRITICAL

A.
B.

Governance Structures................................................... 565

1.
2.

Public Appointments & Removal ........................... 565
Nonprofits Without Public Appointments
or Removal .............................................................. 566
3. Corporate For-Profit SROs ..................................... 569
D. Nonconstitutional, TheoreticalJustifications
for SROs ......................................................................... 570
1. Possible Taxpayer Savings......................................570
2. SRO Stability & Independent Funding ................... 572
3. Access to Superior Industry Expertise .................... 572
E. Systemic Risk from Courts DisruptingSRO
Functioning.................................................................... 572

1.
2.
II.

Potential Direct Disruption to Financial
In stitu tio n s ............................................................... 5 7 3
Potential Market Disruption....................................574

LOOMING CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE

SRO MODEL...........................................................................575
A. Nondelegation DoctrineRisks........................................576
1. General Nondelegation Doctrine.............................577
2. The Private Nondelegation Doctrine & SROs ........ 580
B.

SeparationofPowers Risks ............................................ 583

1.

2.
3.

Implications for SROs from Collins v. Yellen.........585
a. Size & Scope Immaterial ................................. 585
b. Rejecting Public/Private Distinctions .............. 585
c. Rejecting "Indirect" Regulation Arguments .... 586
d. Split over Relief ............................................... 586
Office of Legal Counsel Extends Collins................587
Situating Free EnterpriseFund..............................587
a. Government-Created v.
Government-Authorized .................................. 588
b. Government-Appointed v.
Privately Appointed ......................................... 589

SUPREME RISK

2022 ]

c.

5 45

Expansive Powers to Govern an
Entire Industry ................................................. 590

C . State A ction R isks ........................................................... 59 1
D. Appointments Clause Risks ............................................ 595

1.
2.
III.

SRO Offices May Be Established by Law..............598
SRO Officials Wield Significant Authority ............ 598

MITIGATING THE SYSTEMIC RISK FROM THE SRO MODEL ..... 599

A.

StructuralOptions to Reduce Risk ................................. 600
1. Rolling Back Governmentalization.........................600
a. Reduce Federal Law Enforcement
Responsibilities ................................................ 600
b. Reduce Federal Control Over SRO
Operations ........................................................ 601
2. Increased Governmentalization...............................601
a. Federal Appointments Without
Removal Protections ........................................ 602
b. Respect Constitutional Rights..........................602
c. Fully Nationalize SROs ................................... 603
B. Active Measures to Mitigate JudicialRisk ..................... 603
1. Risk Monitoring ...................................................... 603
2. Generate Favorable Precedents ............................... 604
3. Avoid Negative Precedents ..................................... 604
C. MitigatingAdverse Decisions ........................................ 604
1. Contingency Planning ............................................. 604
2. Contingency Rulemaking & Statutory
Authority.................................................................605
C O N C L U SIO N ......................................................................................... 6 0 6
INTRODUCTION

For generations, quasi-governmental regulators have wielded
governmental power with only tenuous links to our constitutional
architecture. Self-regulatory organizations (SROs) play an enormous,
underappreciated role in the American economy. 1 Today, SROs oversee

1. See Emily Hammond, Double Deference in Administrative Law, 116 COLUM. L. REV.
1705, 1706-07 (2016) (explaining that the role self-regulatory organizations play "is both
counterintuitive to the traditional account of administrative law and almost completely overlooked
as a component of the regulatory state").
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the U.S. electrical grid,2 the brokerage industry,3 derivatives markets, 4
securities exchanges,' municipal securities,6 and other markets. These
SROs have become so important and entwined with markets and
traditional regulatory agencies that some have described them as an
emerging fifth branch of government.7 SROs exist because of political
compromises made in the 1930s, not because any participant at the 1787
Constitutional Convention ever persuaded anyone to authorize them.' In
contrast to traditional administrative agency design, which aims at
ensuring that regulatory bodies remain independent from industry, the
SRO model grants industries control over regulation under deferential
federal oversight. 9 The executive branch generally lacks control over
SRO leadership, with industries electing their own members to serve on
governing boards. 10 Despite SRO centrality and importance, little thought
has been devoted to the systemic risk that the national and global
economy faces should the Supreme Court of the United States suddenly
declare the SRO model unconstitutional or otherwise invalidate financial
regulation." Financial markets might collapse if SROs lost the power to
2. The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) was formed in 2006 and
is overseen by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). NERC is an SRO statutorily
described as an "Electric Reliability Organization" or "ERO." 16 U.S.C. § 824o(a)(2) (stating that
an ERO is an organization "certified by the Commission . . the purpose of which is to establish
and enforce reliability standards for the bulk-power system, subject to Commission review").
3. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(a) (explaining that "[a]n association of brokers and dealers may
be registered as a national securities association").
4. The National Futures Association describes itself as "the industrywide SRO for the U.S.
derivatives industry." NAT'L FUTURES Ass'N, ANNUAL REVIEW 28 (2020), https://www.nfa.futures
.org/about/annual-reviews-files/2020_annualreview.PDF [https://perma.cc/K4NL-ABLF].

5. 15 U.S.C. § 78f(a) (authorizing national securities exchanges to register as SROs under
the Securities and Exchange Commission's oversight).
6.

MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BD., THE ROLE AND JURISDICTION OF THE MSRB 2 (2021),

https://www.msrb.org/msrbl/pdfs/Role-and-Jurisdiction-of-MSRB.pdf

[https://perma.cc/284K-

6JF8] (explaining that the MSRB "was established by Congress in 1975 and charged with a
mandate to protect municipal securities investors, municipal entities, obligated persons [, and the
public interest").
7. William A. Birdthistle & M. Todd Henderson, Becoming a Fifth Branch, 99 CORNELL

L. REV. 1, 24-25 (2013) (describing the "governmentalization" of financial SROs over time).
8. Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street as Community of Fate: Toward FinancialIndustry SelfRegulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 411, 466 (2011) (explaining that SROs are "largely a product of

political compromise and economic expediency" (footnote omitted)).
9. See Hammond, supra note 1, at 1748 ("Overall, the SRO schemes are structured-

whether formally by statute or informally by practice-such that the oversight agencies give
deference to their SROs and the many departures from administrative law norms are hidden.").
10. See Benjamin P. Edwards, The Dark Side of Self-Regulation, 85 U. CIN. L. REV. 573,

614-15 (2017) (suggesting changes to the appointment process for SROs to increase public
accountability).
11. Steven Schwarcz defines systemic risk as "the risk that (i) an economic shock such as
market or institutional failure triggers (through a panic or otherwise) either (X) the failure of a
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enforce their rules or if the Supreme Court simply declared them void.
Recognizing that a Supreme Court decision limiting SROs or interfering
with financial regulation poses systemic risk means that policymakers
must plan for how to manage this risk now.
Even though SROs have operated with federal statutory authority
since 1934, they remain vulnerable to constitutional challenges. Now,
converging lines of judicial decisions create uncertainty about whether
the Supreme Court will declare existing
SRO structures
unconstitutional.1 2 Consider just one opinion. Prior to his appointment to
the Supreme Court, Justice Brett Kavanaugh, then a judge on the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, authored an influential dissent in
Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board,13
questioning the constitutionality of the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board (PCAOB).14 In his dissent, then-Judge Kavanaugh
forcefully argued against giving "rise to a new 'Fifth Branch' of the
Federal Government" on the theory that the PCAOB's structure
improperly interfered with the executive's ability to control law
enforcement, violating both separation of powers principles and the
Appointments Clause. 5 In 2010, the Supreme Court adopted much of
then-Judge Kavanaugh's view that limitations on the executive's ability
to remove members of the PCAOB violated the Constitution's
requirement for separation of powers. 16 But the Court stopped before
adopting his reasoning that the structure also violated the Appointments
Clause.17
To be sure, others have recognized that SROs faced some
constitutional risk after Free EnterpriseFund v. Public Co. Accounting
chain of markets or institutions or (Y) a chain of significant losses to financial institutions, (ii)
resulting in increases in the cost of capital or decreases in its availability, often evidenced by
substantial financial-market price volatility." Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J.
193, 204 (2008).
12. See Roberta S. Karmel, Should Securities Industry Self-Regulatory Organizations Be
Considered Government Agencies?, 14 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 151, 154 (2008) ("Regardless of

whether the PCAOB should properly be categorized as a government regulator, a self-regulator,
or neither, it is unlikely that the courts will decide that the NASD, which operated for almost
seventy years as an SRO, has somehow become an unconstitutional government agency now that
it has become FINRA.").
13. 537 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2008), affd in part, rev'd in part, 561 U.S. 477 (2010).
14. Id. at 685-88 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
15. Id. at 700.

16. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 514 ("While we have sustained in certain cases limits on
the President's removal power, the Act before us imposes a new type of restriction-two levels
of protection from removal for those who nonetheless exercise significant executive power.
Congress cannot limit the President's authority in this way.")
17. Id. at 513-14 (finding that the "Constitution that makes the President accountable to the
people for executing the laws also gives him the . . . authority to remove those who assist him in
carrying out his duties").
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OversightBoard.18 Indeed, Professor Donna M. Nagy pointed out the risk
to SROs before the Supreme Court decided Free Enterprise Fund.19
Since then, others have highlighted doubts about the constitutional status
of other SROs, including the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board
(MSRB) 20 and Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). 2 1
Although the constitutionality of longstanding SROs was not before the
Court in Free EnterpriseFund, Chief Justice John Roberts distinguished
the PCAOB from the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), another SRO,
on the ground that the PCAOB "is a Government-created, Governmentappointed entity, with expansive powers to govern an entire industry." 22
In contrast, the NYSE operated first as a private organization which was
later granted power by the federal government. 23
The Supreme Court's doctrinal trend now amplifies risk for SROs at
a constitutional level. It may be particularly difficult to distinguish SROs
from government agencies, considering reforms that allow at least one
supervising federal agency to amend an SRO's rules as it sees fit.24 There
is not much daylight between a government-created, governmentappointed SRO and today's government-authorized, governmentcontrolled SROs. These weak distinctions may prove insufficient to

18. 561 U.S. 477 (2010).
19. Donna M. Nagy, Is the PCAOB a "Heavily Controlled Component" of the SEC?: An

Essential Question in the ConstitutionalControversy, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 361, 364 (2010) (" [N]o
matter what constitutional verdict is ultimately rendered for the PCAOB, the Court's decision
may affect the self-regulatory organizations (SROs) in the securities industry, such as New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) (formerly,

the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD)).").
20. Richard E. Brodsky, "Something Called the 'Municipal Securities Rulemaking
Board"': Unexamined Issues of Constitutionality, 8 AM. U. Bus. L. REV. 23, 65 (2019) ("A

serious argument can be made that Congress acted unconstitutionally when it mandated the
creation of the MSRB.").
21. See Robert Botkin, FINRA and the Developing Appointments Clause Doctrine, 17
WAKE FOREST J. Bus. & INTELL. PROP. L. 627, 630 (2017) ("As more challenges under the

Appointments Clause arise, Self Regulatory Organizations (SROs) could be caught within the
crosshairs."); Joseph McLaughlin, Is FINRA Constitutional?, 12 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC'Y
PRAc. GRPs. 111, 113 (2011), https://fedsoc.org/commentary/publications/is-finra-constitutional
[https://perma.cc/JX94-PTVM] (arguing that if FINRA wields executive power within the
meaning of the Constitution, then "Free EnterpriseFund inevitably leads to the conclusion that

FINRA is unconstitutional because the President's ability to control FINRA is even less than that
deemed insufficient in Free EnterpriseFund").
22. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 484-85.
23. See Roberta S. Karmel, Turning Seats into Shares: Causes and Implications of
DemutualizationofStock and FuturesExchanges, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 367, 400 (2002) (explaining

that "stock exchanges were private membership organizations under state law" that registered
with the SEC after the passage of federal securities regulations). Instead of having leadership
appointed by a federal agency, industry-created SROs typically elect and appoint their own
leadership. See Edwards, supra note 10, at 614.
24. See Section I.A.
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sustain SROs if they are subjected to direct scrutiny before a majorityconservative Supreme Court, freshly revitalized with Trump-era
appointees.
Recent changes to the Supreme Court's composition mean that the
risk that courts will prune away the fifth branch may be greater than ever
before as constraints on the administrative state increase. 25 SROs will
surely draw close scrutiny because they possess governmental power
without public accountability, creating "an unstable and unsustainable
structure." 2 6 Some of the issues and doctrines highlighted in this Article
have been pitched to the Supreme Court before. Consider the effort to
secure certiorari in the wake of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit's decision in Standard Investment Chartered, Inc. v. National
Association of SecuritiesDealers.2 7 In a per curiam opinion, the Second
Circuit ruled that SRO officials were "absolutely immune from private
damages" from suits alleging that officials made false statements to
induce industry firms to vote in favor of reconstituting the SRO. 28 The
court treated the alleged false statements as having been made as part of
the SRO's exercise of its regulatory functions, entitling it to absolute
immunity. 29 Amicus briefing by the Cato Institute and the Competitive
Enterprise Institute argued in 2011 that the SRO arrangement frustrated
"political accountability" and executive control "due to the layers of
authority separating FINRA from executive branch officers." 30 These
types of arguments will likely find more receptive Justices with the
current Supreme Court. The next time these issues arise for possible
review, there may be enough votes to secure certiorari.
As quasi-governmental organizations, SROs introduce constitutional
complexity and uncertainty, blurring lines between private and public. 3 1
For decades, SROs have enforced federal law and their own rules over
entire industries without affording enforcement targets the protection

25. See Hannah Mullen & Sejal Singh, The Supreme Court Wants to Revive a Doctrine that

WouldParalyzeBiden 'sAdministration,SLATE (Dec. 1, 2020, 12:56 PM), https://slate.com/newsand-politics/2020/12/supreme-court-gundy-doctrine-administrative-state.html [https://perma.cc/
7JD7-NQRJ].
26. Birdthistle & Henderson, supra note 7, at 6.

27. 637 F.3d 112, 114 (2d Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
28. Id.

29. Id. at 116.
30. Brief Amici Curiae of the Cato Institute and the Competitive Enterprise Institute in

Support of Petitioner at 7, Standard Inv. Chartered, Inc. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 565 U.S.
1173 (2012) (No. 11-381), 2011 WL 5128121.
31. See Jennifer M. Pacella, If the Shoe of the SEC Doesn't Fit: Self-Regulatory
OrganizationsandAbsolute Immunity, 58 WAYNE L. REV. 201, 208 (2012) (explaining that SROs
"appear to be conveniently targeted as 'quasi-governmental' organizations when it comes to
immunity protections . . . [and] private organizations for a number of other purposes,
including . . the denial of constitutional due process protections").
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against self-incrimination or due process. 32 At the same time, these SROs
often enjoy the same sovereign immunity as government agencies do
when they exercise regulatory authority. 33
SRO governance models also embed conflicts of interest into industry
governance by blending public power with private ordering. Although
not all SROs are themselves simultaneously profit-seeking corporations,
many are. This structure forces SROs to continually balance their
obligations as regulators and their obligations to their shareholders. For
example, Nasdaq, Inc., a for-profit corporate SRO, prominently warns
investors that the business model contains a significant risk factor
because it owes "self-regulatory obligations and also operate[s] for-profit
businesses." 34 Nasdaq explains that "these two roles may create conflicts
of interest," and that it has "obligations to regulate and . . . ensure
compliance with applicable law and the rules of [its] markets." 3 5
Critically, the effects of a court decision declaring a significant SRO
unconstitutional would likely extend well beyond any single market
overseen by the particular SRO. For example, consider what might
happen if the Supreme Court declared all rules enacted by the MSRB
unconstitutional and void, with language indicating that it would likely
declare actions by other, similarly structured SROs unconstitutional. The
decision could impact municipal bond prices and potentially trigger
significant insurance payouts and impacts in futures markets. The point
is not to say that the shock would unfold in any single way, but that the
effect of such a decision could extend beyond a single market regulated
by the SRO before the Supreme Court. The underlying rationale for the

32. See, e.g., United States v. Solomon, 509 F.2d 863, 867-69 (2d Cir. 1975) (finding that

an SRO compelling a member to answer questions in the SRO's investigation does not violate the
Fifth Amendment because the SRO is not a state actor); Jones v. SEC, 115 F.3d 1173, 1183 (4th
Cir. 1997) (finding that "the NASD is a private party and not a governmental agent"). But see
Rooms v. SEC, 444 F.3d 1208, 1214 (10th Cir. 2006) ("Due process requires that an NASD rule

give fair warning of prohibited conduct before a person may be disciplined for that conduct.").
33. See Standard nv. Chartered, Inc., 637 F.3d at 115 ("There is no question that an SRO

and its officers are entitled to absolute immunity from private damages suits in connection with
the discharge of their regulatory responsibilities."); Mohlman v. FINRA, Inc., No. 3:19-cv-154,
2020 WL 905269, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 25, 2020) ("FINRA is immune 'from suit for conduct

falling within the scope of the SRO's regulatory and general oversight functions.

"'

(quoting

D'Alessio v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 258 F.3d 93, 105 (2d Cir. 2001))), aff'd, 977 F.3d 556 (6th

Cir. 2020); Hurry v. FINRA, Inc., No. CV-14-02490, 2015 WL 11118114, at *5 (D. Ariz. Aug.
5, 2015) (concluding that, because regulatory immunity derives from sovereign immunity, it
extends to FINRA employees carrying out their duties), aff'd, 782 F. App'x 600 (9th Cir. 2019).

34. Nasdaq, Inc., Annual Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934 for the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2020 (Form 10-K) 25 (Feb. 23,

2021), https://ir.nasdaq.com/sec-filings/sec-filing/10-k/0001120193-21-000011
/5U6H-A7QT].
35. Id.

[https://perma.cc

2022 ]

SUPREME RISK

5 51

decision would immediately weaken the authority of other SROs, causing
uncertainty to ripple through their markets as well. 36
Financially, the impact of such a decision could run into the billions,
if not trillions, of dollars. Some SROs have even been designated as
financial market utilities, meaning that an interruption in their operations
could threaten the financial stability of the U.S. financial system. 37 Yet
the fact that these SROs often play critical roles in supporting financial
market infrastructure has no bearing on whether their structure and
authority fits within the U.S. constitutional system.
Judicial decisions could trigger these consequences without judges or
Justices intending or foreseeing these effects. Judges and Justices may
mistakenly believe that markets will seamlessly adapt to their decisions,
or simply fail to foresee consequences which may flow from declaring an
SRO arrangement unconstitutional. As modern financial markets are
complex and interconnected, a decision striking a critical piece of
financial market infrastructure will likely reverberate through markets,
causing consequences elsewhere in the real economy. For example,
consider how a decision causing major banks to temporarily suspend
bond issuance during a period of judicially created uncertainty could
affect the real economy. If the bond markets ceased providing capital,
issuers would no longer be able to use offering proceeds to fund their
operations. This means paychecks would not go out, and invoices for
ordinary things like power, water, and electricity would go unpaid. The
real economy depends on stable and accessible financial markets to
function.
This Article demonstrates the need to act to manage the systemic risk
posed by the SRO model in the current constitutional era. Part I provides
an overview of the SRO regulatory model, shedding light on a critically
important yet notoriously understudied regulatory model. 38 It captures
what many others have missed: the way gradual changes have
transformed SROs to more closely resemble de facto arms of the federal
36. See Kathryn Judge, Fragmentation Nodes: A Study in Financial Innovation,
Complexity, andSystemic Risk, 64 STAN. L. REV. 657, 697 (2012) ("When a signal conveys new

information suggesting that an investor has dramatically underappreciated the nature or magnitude
of a risk to which he is exposed, that revelation introduces the possibility that the investor may
also be exposed to other underappreciated risks.").
37. 12 U.S.C. § 5462(9).
38. Jonathan Macey & Caroline Novogrod, Enforcing Self-Regulatory Organization's
Penaltiesand the Nature of Self-Regulation, 40 HOFSTRA L. REv. 963, 963 (2012) ("Few issues

are as poorly understood and under-theorized as the concept of 'industry self-regulation."');
Andrew F. Tuch, The Self-Regulation of Investment Bankers, 83 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 101, 105
(2014) (explaining that FINRA's "self-regulation of investment bankers has thus far attracted
scant scholarly attention"); Omarova, supra note 8, at 414-15 ("[W]hat is conspicuously absent
from the . . .broader debate among academics and policy-makers, is a meaningful discussion of
the role and shape of industry self-regulation in the emerging postcrisis regulatory order .... ").
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government. These SROs now often enforce, interpret, and apply federal
law in a symbiotic relationship with their supervising agencies. Part I also
addresses the critical roles SROs play in our financial system and
explains how markets could collapse should a court decision suddenly
declare an SRO unconstitutional.
In Part II, this Article details specific constitutional doctrines
resurging under a majority-conservative Supreme Court. It analyses
recent cases-moving beyond the decade-old implication from Free
Enterprise Fund-to recognize the growing, additional risks. 39 Two
major findings are worth mentioning. First, the post-Trump-era Supreme
Court consistently favors ensuring that the President maintains control
over the leadership of regulatory bodies. 40 Because many SROs cannot
be directly overseen by presidential power and often elect and appoint
their own leadership, SROs will inevitably draw additional scrutiny. The
literature has not yet recognized the impact of the Supreme Court's 2020
and 2021 decisions in Seila Law LLC v. Consumer FinancialProtection

Bureau4 1 and Collins v. Yellen,4 2 which both reinforce this conclusion and
create additional risks for SROs. 4 3
Second, the Supreme Court appears poised to revitalize the
nondelegation doctrine-a doctrine that had its heyday in the New Deal
era, largely slumbering since. Although the precise contours of the
doctrine, what it prohibits, and whether it even exists remains hotly
disputed, expanding the nondelegation doctrine would likely place more
limits on Congress's ability to delegate power to SROs and administrative
agencies.4 4 Five Justices have expressed some form of interest in
revisiting the doctrine.4 5 Bringing the likely total to six, Justice Amy
Coney Barrett previously supported an expanded role for nondelegation
doctrine in habeas corpus cases as an academic. 4 6 In short, SROs face real
danger from current constitutional law trends.
This Article does not argue that the Supreme Court should declare the
SRO regulatory model unconstitutional or that the decisions and trends
creating these risks were correctly decided. Yet blithely insisting that the
Supreme Court would be wrong to declare SROs unconstitutional would
do little good to prepare for the aftermath of this type of readily
39. See infra Part II.
40. See id.

41. 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020).
42. 141 S. Ct. 1761 (2021).

43. Seila Law LLC, 140 S. Ct. at 2191-92; Collins, 141 S. Ct. at 1770.
44. Section II.A discusses nondelegation doctrine in more detail.
45. See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2131, 2148 (2019) (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting); id. at 2130-31 (Auto, J., concurring); see also Paul v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 342,

342 (2019) (mem.) (Kavanaugh, J., respecting the denial of certiorari) (noting that Justice
Gorsuch's dissent in Gundy "warrant[s] further consideration in future cases").
46. Amy Coney Barrett, Suspension and Delegation, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 251, 256 (2014).
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foreseeable development. The goal of this Article is to highlight the
systemic risk and the need to respond to it.
Lastly, Part III discusses the important practical and theoretical
implications of recognizing the Supreme Court as a source of systemic
risk. It provides guidance to SRO leadership, market participants, and
policymakers on ways to manage risks to the global financial system
which may emerge from a decision invalidating the SRO regulatory
model. Prudent changes to existing SRO governance structures may
reduce the likelihood that the Supreme Court will declare them
unconstitutional. Of course, Congress need not preemptively abandon the
SRO model entirely. Congress could engage in constitutional
contingency planning and authorize executive action to assume SRO
responsibilities should the Supreme Court declare the SRO model
unconstitutional.
I. THE CRITICAL SRO REGULATORY MODEL
SROs play a critical role in the global economy and regulatory
framework and serve as frontline regulators overseen by administrative
agencies. 47 Although SROs have been used in a variety of regulatory
contexts, they are most common in financial regulation. This Article
touches on other SROs but predominantly focuses on SROs in financial
regulation because SROs have been most heavily deployed to regulate
financial service markets. Below, Section A describes the general
structure for SROs. Section B details the expansive legal powers SROs
now possess. Section C discusses common, lightly supervised
governance structures for SROs. Section D briefly overviews common,
nonconstitutional, theoretical justifications for embracing the SRO model
as well.
A. The SRO Model and History
There are many different forms of industry self-regulation. Both
federal and state governments delegate power to industry members and
groups to control their own licensing or regulation. 4 8 In many states,
industry members enjoy the authority to restrict entry into their
professions by imposing and administering licensing examinations or

47. Gina-Gail S. Fletcher, Benchmark Regulation, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1929, 1970 (2017)
("The SRO is the first-tier regulator-it monitors and polices members, maintains industry
integrity, and ensures compliance with adopted regulations. At the second tier is the relevant
government agency that oversees the SRO.").
48. See Nick Robinson, The Multiple Justifications of OccupationalLicensing, 93 WASH.
L. REv. 1903, 1918 (2018) (finding "state governments generally still decide what activities to
license and then frequently delegate the actual implementation of licensing requirements to
volunteer, or quasi-volunteer, boards of practitioners operating at the state level").
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erecting other barriers to entry. 49 In theory, these gatekeeping bodies
protect the public from abuse in situations where the public cannot
reliably evaluate service quality. 0
SROs protect the public by policing their own industries. Historically,
SROs began with self-regulating stock exchanges. 51 The law treated these
organizations as private clubs that could set their own rules for how club
members behaved.5 2 Functionally, private clubs could not entirely
regulate and control the market because not every market participant
opted to join these private clubs. 53 In the securities industry, many
transactions occur outside of these self-regulating exchanges. 54 To corral
industry members together into a self-regulating group, an industry
association needs legal status and a requirement that market participants
join the SRO.5 5 The government's blessing of these arrangements
empowers SROs to control their industries by controlling club
membership.5 6
Simply identifying the boundary between SROs and the government
remains difficult. Consider the PCAOB-some view the entity as falling
outside the SRO category because it was created by the government and
because its leadership was appointed by the government.5 7 In contrast,
others classify it as an SRO because it enjoys power to enforce
membership rules and impose professional standards.5 8 Similarly,
49. Id. at 1921.
50. See Benjamin P. Edwards, The Professional Prospectus: A Call for Effective
Professional Disclosure, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1457, 1489 (2017) ("Self-regulating

professions often defend occupational licensing by arguing that it protects the public from abuse
and exploitation when market forces fail.").
51. See Karmel, supra note 23, at 400 (explaining that "stock exchanges were private

membership organizations under state law").
52. See James Fallows Tierney, The Political Economy of Securities Industry Bars 3
(Feb. 24, 2021) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
3761903 [https://perma.cc/9JTG-MYDT].
53. Id. at 17.
54. Id. at 21 n.91.
55.

See SEC, RELEASE NO. 34-50700, CONCEPT RELEASE CONCERNING SELF-REGULATION,

69 Fed. Reg. 71,256, 71,257 (Dec. 8, 2004), https://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/34-50700.htm

[https://perma.cc/GU2E-73PZ] ("[T]he Commission and leaders of the investment banking
community generally agreed that an industry association needed official legal status in order to
effectively carry out the task of self-regulating the OTC market.").
56. See Tierney, supra note 52, at 3.
57. Stephen Bainbridge (@PrawfBainbridge), TWITTER (July 6, 2021, 7:52 PM),
https://twitter.com/PrawfBainbridge/status/1412560116025479169?s=20 [https://perma.cc/TWV7-

6Y45] ("Unlike the self-regulatory organizations, however, the Board is a Government-created,
Government-appointed entity .... " (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd.,
561 U.S. 477, 485 (2010))).
58. See John C. Coffee, Backstabbing in Washington: The Curious Case of the PCAOB,
CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Sept. 21, 2015),
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opinions diverge over whether FINRA, generally viewed as an SRO,
should even be called an SRO today. 59
Putting differences of opinion over the definition of an SRO aside,
this Article focuses on industry control over its own regulation through
audited SROs under federal administrative agency oversight.6 o
Describing these SROs as "audited" does not refer to professional
accountants scrutinizing their financial reports. Instead, an overseeing
federal agency relies on information provided by the SRO while verifying
that the SRO uses sensible procedures to generate information with
occasional spot-checks to confirm that the SRO provides accurate
information. 61
Although Congress embraced and empowered the SRO model in the
aftermath of the Great Depression, Congress did not create it. Financial
firms, particularly securities exchanges, have a long history of private
market regulation. 62 The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), organized
in 1792, has been privately regulating securities trading among its
members since its inception. 63 Industry self-regulation initially served to
fix prices with the initial NYSE members "solemnly promis[ing] . . . not
[to] buy or sell . . . for any person whatsoever, any kind of public stock,
at a less rate than one quarter per cent commission on the specie value
and [to] give a preference to each other in [their] negotiations."6 4
Although the early NYSE claimed to also protect the public, most of its

https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2015/09/21/backstabbing-in-washington-the-curious-caseof-the-pcaob/ [https://perma.cc/SZ6Y-PT48] (describing the PCAOB as an SRO because its
"authority (unlike that of the SEC) goes well beyond anti-fraud rules and permits [it] to enforce
the 'rules of the club'-i.e., professional standards").
59. Hester Peirce, The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority: Not Self-Regulation After
All 3 (Mercatus Ctr., Working Paper, 2015),

https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/Peirce-

FINRA.pdf [https://perma.cc/V8GX-YWBV] ("FINRA is not the self-regulatory organization
(SRO) some imagine it to be.... [I]ts governance structure means that it is not accountable to the
industry it regulates the way an SRO would be.").
60. See Douglas C. Michael, Federal Agency Use of Audited Self-Regulation as a
Regulatory Technique, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 171, 175-77 (1995) ("'Audited self-regulation' is

defined as the delegation by Congress or a federal agency to a nongovernmental entity the power
to implement laws or agency regulations, with powers of review and independent action retained
by a federal agency.").
61. Id. at 176.
62. See Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453, 1457 (1997)

("For most of their history, then, exchanges have been the primary regulators of securities
markets.").
63. See Karmel, supra note 12, at 159 ("The NYSE was organized in 1792 to govern

securities trading in the wake of a scandal in the government bond market in the early days of the
United States.").
64. The Institution ofExperience: Self-Regulatory Organizations in the Securities Industry,
1792-2010, SEC HIST. Soc'Y, http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/galleries/sro/sro02b.php
[https://perma.cc/4K23-JUY9].
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early enforcement activity aimed to discipline members for violating its
minimum commission rules. 65
Congress began to regulate securities markets and endow the SRO
regulatory model with federal authority in the 1930s. As a first step,
Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933,66 embracing a disclosure
regime for securities offerings that paralleled the NYSE's approach.67
One year later, Congress passed the Securities and Exchange Act of
193468 (Exchange Act), creating the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and delegating federal authority to national securities
exchanges registering with the SEC. 69 The Exchange Act effectively
transformed the NYSE and regional stock exchanges from purely private
clubs into the first audited SROs. 70
The SRO model put federal authority behind the exchanges while
allowing them to maintain their leadership role and independence. 7 1
Former SEC Chair and later Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas
famously characterized the SEC's oversight role as "letting the exchanges
take the leadership with Government playing a residual role. Government
would keep the shotgun, so to speak, behind the door, loaded, well oiled,
cleaned, ready for use but with the hope it would never have to be used." 72
Congress expanded its reliance on SROs in 1938 by passing the
Maloney Act 7 3 to regulate off-exchange securities trading. 7 4 The
legislation authorized the creation of one or more SROs to regulate overthe-counter markets, such as trading done outside of exchanges already

65. See Edwards, supra note 10, at 579-80.

66. Ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.

§§ 77a-77aa).

67. See Kristin N. Johnson, GoverningFinancialMarkets: Regulating Conflicts, 88 WASH.

L. REV. 185, 202-03 (2013) ("When federal legislators adopted statutes regulating securities
market transactions nearly one hundred years later, Congress instituted a mandatory disclosureoriented regime that paralleled the NYSE's approach.").
68. Ch. 404, 48 Stat. 811 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78qq).
69. 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) ("There is hereby established a Securities and Exchange
Commission...."); id. § 78f(a) ("An exchange may be registered as a national securities exchange
under the terms and conditions hereinafter provided in this section .... ").
70. See William I. Friedman, The Fourteenth Amendment's Public/Private Distinction
Among SecuritiesRegulators in the US. Marketplace-Revisited, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 727,
728-30 (2004) (discussing the transformation of the NYSE into an SRO).
71. Id. at 728.
72. WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE: THE ADDRESSES AND PUBLIC
STATEMENTS OF WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS AS MEMBER AND CHAIRMAN OF THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION 82 (James Allen ed., 1940).
73. Ch. 677, 52 Stat. 1070 (1938) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 780-3).
74. See Comment, Over-the-Counter TradingandtheMaloneyAct, 48 YALE L.J. 633, 637-

44 (1939) ("The Maloney Act is intended to deal with those factors which prevent the over-thecounter markets, in their present unorganized condition, from giving the investing public the same
uniformly fair treatment which the Commission has by regulation made available upon the
national securities exchanges.").
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regulated and subject to SEC oversight, through the SRO model. 7 5
Shortly after Congress passed the Maloney Act, the SEC approved the
National Association of Securities Dealers' (NASD) application to serve
as the SRO for brokerage firms. 76 In 2007, the NASD merged with a
regulatory arm of the NYSE to form FINRA. 77
For a time, the SEC attempted to offer an alternative to SRO
regulation for brokerage firms operating in the over-the-counter
marketplace. The SEC Only registration program (SECO) ran for
eighteen years. 7 8 Upon SECO's closure in 1983, Congress amended the
Exchange Act to require brokerages to register with an SRO to remain in
business. 79 A House Congressional Report on the legislation deemed
SRO enforcement superior because it allowed for a broader range of
enforcement tools. 80 The Report recognized that the industry SRO could
do things the SEC could not, including promulgating "ethical standards"
as well as promoting "just and equitable principles of trade." 8 1 It also
recognized that attempting to make the SECO registration program
equivalent to the industry SRO would require significant, additional
expenditures by the SEC.8 2
Now, many industries find themselves governed by a tag team of
regulators-a federal agency and an ostensibly private SRO overseen by
the federal agency. For example, Congress created the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) in 1974,83 which simultaneously
embraced the SRO regulatory model for futures markets. 84 Authorized by
the same legislation as the CFTC, the National Futures Association
(NFA) now oversees the futures markets under the CFTC's supervision.8 5
In authorizing the NFA, Congress desired a "private sector selfregulatory organization [to] serve the futures industry more efficiently

75.

§ 15A(a), 52 Stat. at 1070 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 780-3).

76. See NAT'L Ass'N OF SEC. DEALERS, INC., at i (1997), https://www.finra.org/sites/default/
files/Corporate/p009762.pdf [https://perma.cc/S5G2-EKL2].
77. See Nancy Condon & Herb Perone, NASD and NYSE Member Regulation Combine to
Form the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority - FINRA, FINRA (July 30, 2007),

https://www.finra.org/media-center/news-releases/2007/nasd-and-nyse-member-regulation-combine
-form-financial-industry [https://perma.cc/7LLE-PC4H].
78. See SEC, supra note 55, at 71,267.
79. Id.
80. See H.R. REP. No. 98-106, at 6 (1983), as reprintedin 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N. 592, 597.

81. Id.
82. Id. at 6-7.
83. Pub. L. No. 93-463,

§

101(a)(3), 88 Stat. 1389, 1389 (codified as amended in scattered

sections of 5 U.S.C. and 7 U.S.C.).
84. Id. § 301.
85. About NFA, NAT'L FUTURES Ass'N, https://www.nfa.futures.org/about/index.html
[https ://perma.cc/XW4K-E8TY].
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and at a lesser cost than would the government." 8 6 Despite being a
"private" organization, membership in the SRO remains mandatory for
industry members.8 7
SROs use their private status to enforce vague rules in ways that an
ordinary administrative agency could not. Consider the Federal
Communications Commission's (FCC) indecency policy held
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in FCC v. Fox Television Stations,
Inc. (Fox). 88 The FCC penalized broadcasters for airing content it deemed
"indecent," such as George Carlin's famous "Filthy Words"
monologue. 89 There, the Supreme Court explained that vague indecency
prohibitions violated basic due process requirements. 90 These rules apply
when a state actor makes rules penalizing conduct.
In contrast, an SRO, ostensibly a private organization, may not be
bound by constitutional requirements, allowing it to enforce vague and
undefined rules. A private organization can regulate and oversee its
members in ways that a public agency cannot because a private
organization is not a state actor. Consider FINRA Rule 2010, which
provides that a FINRA "member, in the conduct of its business, shall
observe high standards of commercial honor and just and equitable
principles of trade." 91 This lacks any clear meaning. Professors William
A. Birdthistle and M. Todd Henderson theorized "that the rule operates
to capture conduct that cannot be efficiently or easily proved to violate
another rule, but that FINRA believes is worthy of sanction." 92 They
explain that "the vagueness of Rule 2010 is its power, in that it lowers
monitoring and enforcement costs and provides a broad net to catch bad
brokers who would escape punishment in a more formalistic
environment." 93
Consider how society might differ if the SRO model had been used to
control more industries. If an SRO had issued and enforced the decency
regulations at issue in Fox instead of the FCC, American television
broadcasts might be remarkably different today. A private club may

86. NFA History, NAT'L FUTURES Ass'N, https://www.nfa.futures.org/about/nfahistory.html [https://perma.cc/LU38-3D6E].
87. Id.
88. 567 U.S. 239, 258 (2012).
89. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750-55 (1978) (appending George Carlin's

monologue).
90. Fox, 567 U.S. at 253.
91. FINRA, RULE 2010 (2021), https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/rulebooks/finrarules/2010 [https://perma.cc/J9T8-CVSD].
92. Birdthistle & Henderson, supra note 7, at 62.

93. Id. at 63. Although there is some constraint on this because a FINRA sanction may be
appealed to the SEC, and then onward to federal courts.
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enforce its own vague rules however it deems appropriate. George
Carlin's famous monologue might never have been broadcasted. 94
As the SRO model grew, SROs became more entwined with federal
agencies in ways that raise questions about their status as private rather
than state actors. In 1975, Congress amended the Exchange Act yet again
to give the SEC more power over the SROs that it oversees. 95 Now, the
SEC has the power to approve SRO rule changes and the ability to require
an SEC-supervised SRO to enact or modify any rule as the SEC deems
necessary. 96 This means that the SEC can simply edit an SRO's rules at
any time. 97 These changes effectively entwined the SEC and its SROs,
making it difficult to characterize the SEC's role as purely oversight. 98
The SEC's power to enact or modify SRO rules also creates new and
unexplored constitutional questions. The SEC might desire a rule beyond
its ordinary enactment authority. Could the SEC modify the SRO's rules
to require the SRO to do something that the SEC itself could not do? For
example, the SEC might require FINRA to impose additional, prior
restraints on advertisements about certain financial products or strategies.
After all, FINRA already requires brokerages to preclear certain
advertisements. 99 The SEC might also informally encourage the SRO to
enact such a rule on its own to avoid the need to initiate a rulemaking
process. This power to simply approve an SRO regulation may
effectively enable the SEC to use the SRO as a puppet to regulate the
markets in ways that circumvent the SEC's constitutional limitations.
SROs may be able to take action after an informal request without the
SEC ever needing to take any public, affirmative step to approve the
conduct. Some SRO rule changes do not require SEC approval before
taking effect. For example, rule proposals clarifying the meaning of
existing SRO rules may be given immediate effect. 10 0 Similarly, changes
to fees or rules concerning an SRO's internal affairs may be immediately

94. Of course, having to play within constitutional rules would increase enforcement costs
for SROs.
95. Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (1975).
96. See Karmel, supra note 12, at 159-60.

97. See 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (stating that the SEC may by rule "add to, and delete from ... the
rules of a self-regulatory organization ... to insure the fair administration of the self-regulatory
organization, to conform its rules to requirements of this chapter . . or otherwise in furtherance
of the purposes of this chapter").
98. Richard L. Stone & Michael A. Perino, Not Just a Private Club: Self Regulatory
Organizations as State Actors when Enforcing Federal Law, 1995 COLUM. BUS. L. REv. 453, 463

(explaining that the SEC's "involvement with the SROs' rule-making process is much more
extensive than it was prior to 1975, and is clearly greater than merely one of oversight").
99. See, e.g., FINRA, RULE 2220 (2021) (regulating communications about options).
100. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(3).
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effective without SEC approval. 10 1 This leaves substantial room for
significant and immediately effective SRO rules.
The statutory provision giving the SEC authority to amend SRO rules
seems to enable the SEC to shift accountability for its binding rules to
SROs. The statutory provision specifically declares that amendments to
SRO rules by the SEC "shall be considered for all purposes of this chapter
to be part of the rules of such self-regulatory organization and shall not
be considered to be a rule of the Commission."t 2
This is not to say that federal administrative agencies exercise total
control over the SROs they oversee. Functionally, industry members
usually retain substantial influence over the SRO. This creates an
incentive for the SRO to seek some middle ground to avoid upsetting its
members with overly intrusive action while also remaining active enough
to keep the SEC's "shotgun" behind the door. 103
B. Expansive SRO Powers to Enforce FederalLaw
Many SROs exercise significant power under federal law and entirely
control access to their industries. In practice, this means that they wield
federal power to drive regulatory policy and control how federal law is
enforced within their zone of influence.
1. Enforcing Federal Law Without Presidential Control
Ordinary depictions of the federal government present the executive
and administrative state as responsible for enforcing federal law pursuant
to the Take Care Clause in Article II of the U.S. Constitution. 104 Yet
statutes authorizing SROs often mandate that an SRO must enforce
federal law when overseeing its members without regard for presidential
control. 105 The statute authorizing exchanges to register as SROs requires
that to maintain its registration, an SRO's members and persons
associated with its members "shall be appropriately disciplined for
violati[ng]" the Exchange Act as well as federal rules and regulations by
a broad range of penalties. 106 Similarly, federal law requires FINRA to
enforce the Exchange Act, the Exchange Act Rules, FINRA's own rules,

101. Id.
102. Id. § 78s(c)(4)(C).
103. See Edwards, supra note 10, at 599-600 (explaining that industry members of an SRO

have a limited incentive to self-police).
104. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
105. See Stone & Perino, supra note 98, at 463 ("[T]he compulsion for SROs to perform

enforcement activities and the delegation of law enforcement functions to the SROs ... suggests
that SROs should be viewed as state actors when enforcing federal law.").
106. 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(6) (emphasis added).
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and MSRB rules. 107 These requirements effectively force SROs to serve
as frontline enforcers of federal law and policy.
Functionally, federal law could not be enforced with current resources
absent SROs. For instance, the SEC could not effectively oversee markets
without SROs today. At its current staffing and funding level, the SEC
only has a total of 4,441 employees spread across five divisions and
twenty-five different offices. 10 8 Yet its oversight encompasses over 7,600
reporting companies, more than 28,000 registered entities, seven different
clearing agencies, twenty-four national securities exchanges, and nine
credit rating agencies. 109
Although statutorily mandated to enforce federal law, SROs control
their own staffing, resource allocations, and investigative priorities and
may not always opt to vigorously investigate and enforce federal law.11 0
SROs enjoy functional discretion over how they allocate their personnel
and resources. This means that an SRO's priorities may not fully align
with the executive branch's desires.
At times, SROs have failed to prevent truly massive harm and have
missed significant violations of federal law. Consider the combined
failure of the SEC and SROs to detect Bernard Madoff s recordshattering Ponzi scheme." An after-action review of the failure
generally described SRO reviews of Madoffs operations and oversight
examinations as lacking.1 1 2 The SEC Office of Investigations noted that
issues were "completely missed" with SRO staff examiners being
described as conducting simple "checklist-type reviews" where they did
not "think outside the box." 1 1 3 To be fair to the SROs, the SEC also failed
to uncover Madoff's massive fraud, and the after-action reports revealed
significant problems with the SEC's oversight as well. 11 4
SROs differ from federal agencies in that the President can more
readily control federal agencies and make changes if dissatisfied with
107. Id. § 78s(g); see Alan Lawhead, Useful Limits to the Fifth Amendment: Examining the
Benefits That Flow from a PrivateRegulator'sAbility to DemandAnswers to Its QuestionsDuring
an Investigation, 2009 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 210, 222 ("FINRA must enforce compliance by its

members with the Exchange Act, including Exchange Act rules, and FINRA's rules.").
108.

SEC, AGENCY FINANCIAL REPORT 7 (Nov. 12, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/files/sec-

2020-agency-financial-report

1.pdf [https://perma.cc/BL6Q-W68U].

109. Id. at 125.

110. See Edwards, supra note 10, at 608 ("While traditional regulatory agencies may also be
prone to inaction, self-regulatory bodies may be particularly lethargic protectors in situations
where actions in the public's interest would undercut private profits.").
111.
FAILURE

See generally SEC, OFF. OF INVESTIGATIONS, REPORT NO. OIG-509, INVESTIGATION OF
OF

THE

SEC

TO

UNCOVER

BERNARD

MADOFF'S

PONZI

SCHEME

(2009),

https://www.sec.gov/files/oig-509.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RA52-PNXC] (discussing various
failures by the SRO Group when conducting examinations of Bernie Madoff's Ponzi scheme).
112. Id. at 176.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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their performance. This can happen in different ways. By exercising the
appointment power, the President can install leadership committed to
prioritizing the President's agenda.1 1 5 Although sometimes limited by
for-cause removal protections, the President also generally enjoys the
power to remove the heads of executive agencies if the President is
dissatisfied with their performance.1 16 Yet a president concerned about
lax law enforcement practices of SROs has no direct power to make
changes to SRO personnel. Indeed, the Supreme Court found the forcause removal protections afforded to the PCAOB's leadership were
unconstitutional because it perceived the limitation as unduly insulating
it from presidential control.1 17
2. Controlling Access to Their Industries
Most enabling statutes for SROs mandate that industry participants
join an SRO to conduct business. 1"' The requirement for industry
members to maintain SRO membership gives the SRO leverage to
compel its members to comply with its rules because the SRO can
effectively put its industry members out of business by simply kicking
them out of the SRO. 119 Of course, this power will not always control
behavior in situations where an industry member could, hypothetically,
join a different SRO to make as much money in a similar industry not
overseen by the former SRO. 120 Still, an SRO's ability to deny
registration to a firm or impose a lifetime ban on an individual gives it
substantial enforcement power.
In some instances, SROs may move more quickly and effectively to
excise fraudsters, scoundrels, and miscreants from industries. Consider
the NFA's decision to permanently ban Jacob Wohl from the futures
industry. Wohl rose to infamy during former-President Donald Trump's
campaign and administration for peddling a series of bogus claims about
Senator Elizabeth Warren, former FBI director Robert Mueller, Chief

115. See, e.g., Lisa Friedman, Senate Confirms Biden's Pick to Lead E.P.A., N.Y. TIM'Es
(Mar. 15, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/10/climate/michael-s-regan-epa-biden.html

[https://perma.cc/29TM-3N9X] (explaining that President Biden's top EPA appointment is likely
to "drive some of the Biden administration's biggest climate and regulatory policies").
116. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 134-35 (1926).
117. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 484 (2010).

118. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(8) (requiring brokerage firms to join a registered securities
association to be able to buy and sell securities).
119. Macey & Novogrod, supra note 38, at 966 ("SROs traditionally have been able to

enforce their own rules without having to use the government's civil and criminal enforcement
power . . . by maintaining a monopoly and using their credible threat to be able to exclude a
participating firm from the cartel as its ultimate enforcement mechanism.").
120. Id.
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Medical Advisor Anthony Fauci, President Joseph Biden, and others. 121
In 2016, the NFA filed a complaint against then eighteen-year-old Wohl
alleging that he had promoted himself and his firm in ways that were
"unbalanced in their presentation of profit potential and risk of loss."122
The NFA reached a decision in 2017 explaining a range of concerns,
including that Wohl had allegedly taken a $75,000 investment and
claimed to have increased its value while refusing to return the investor's
funds, as well as the concern that Wohl refused to cooperate with the
NFA's investigation. 123 This NFA decision "permanently barred" Wohl
"from NFA membership, associate membership, and from acting as a
principal of an NFA member." 1 2 4 It took the NFA approximately six
months to permanently bar Wohl from the industry. 12 5
3. Limited Power Over Nonmembers
In most instances, an SRO's ability to enforce its rules and federal law
turns on whether the entity or person remains subject to the SRO's
jurisdiction. This is usually not a problem for those currently in the
industry who typically must be members of the SRO or work for a
member firm. Jurisdiction matters because it dictates when an SRO can
force a person to comply with a sanctions order or force a person to
provide testimony under the SRO's version of a subpoena. FINRA, for
example, typically loses jurisdiction over people two years after they
leave the industry. 12 6 Persons escaping an SRO's jurisdiction no longer
have any incentive to cooperate with the SRO-raising enforcement and
monitoring costs and potentially undercutting investor protection.
One notable case, Fierov. FinancialIndustry Regulatory Authority 127
showcases this dynamic. 128 In 2000, a FINRA panel expelled Fiero
Brothers, Inc. from the FINRA and ordered Fiero Brothers to pay more
than $1 million in fines for violating federal securities laws and the SRO's
121. Bridget Read, All ofJacob Wohl's Spectacularly FailedSmear Attempts, CUT (May 7,
2020), https://www.thecut.com/2020/05/who-is-jacob-wohl-failed-smears.html [https://perma.cc
/8ZJJ-972F] (explaining that "Jacob Wohl is simply unparalleled in the field of failed smear
attempts").
122. Complaint at 2, NEX Cap. Mgmt. LLC, NFA Case No. 16-BCC-011 (Aug. 19, 2016),

https://www.nfa.futures.org/basicnet/regulatory-actions-detail-doc.aspx?docid=4345&rnd=5543
859a-fcea-4981-b0f5-3b276f32068b [https://perma.cc/ZX54-9ZWT].
123. NEX Cap. Mgmt LLC, NFA Case No. 16-BCC-011, at 12 (Mar. 2, 2017),

https://www.nfa.futures.org/basicnet/regulatory-actions-detail-doc.aspx?docid=4428&rnd=5dfd
6c10-0c6c-46e5-8b31-bcf0a201428f [https://perma.cc/J32W-RSG2].
124. Id.

125. The initial complaint was filed in August of 2016, but Wohl was "permanently barred
from NFA membership" in March of 2017. See id. at 1, 12.
126. FINRA, RETENTION OF JURISDICTION, https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/rulebooks/
corporate-organization/retention-jurisdiction-0 [https://perma.cc/2FKE-KAKA].
127. 660 F.3d 569 (2d Cir. 2011).
128. Id. at 571.
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rules. 12 9 Fiero Brothers did not pay the fine.130 Three years later, FINRA
initiated a state court action to collect the fine, proceeding on a breach of
contract theory.13 1 On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals found that
state courts lacked jurisdiction over the dispute because FINRA sought
to collect for liability created under the Exchange Act. 132 The Exchange
Act specifies that federal courts have "exclusive jurisdiction" for "all
suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty
created" by the Exchange Act. 133
After Fiero Brothers sought a declaratory judgment that it did not have
to pay the fine, the issue eventually ended up before the Second Circuit
which found that FINRA lacked statutory authority to enforce its fines
through breach of contract actions. 134 The Second Circuit noted that
"there is no express statutory authority for [SROs] to bring judicial
actions to enforce the collection of fines." 135 It concluded that FINRA
lacked the power to bring court actions to enforce its fines because
nothing in the Exchange Act granted FINRA that power. 13 6
FINRA argued that it should be able to enforce its fines by court action
because FINRA promulgated a rule saying that it could go to court to
collect. 137 The Second Circuit also rejected this argument by finding that
the way FINRA enacted the rule, providing itself with the ability to
collect fines, violated the Exchange Act. 138 It found that the rule was not
properly promulgated because it did not go through the notice and
comment process. 139
The Fiero decision illustrates how courts will confine an SRO's
authority over its members. Although the defect in the FINRA rule could
be remedied by promulgating and enforcing a rule through the notice and
comment process, the adoption of such a rule would still not give the SRO
any authority over a person who was never a member of the SRO and
thus, never contractually bound to follow its rules and submit to its
discipline.

129. Id. at 572.

130. Id.
131. Id.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

FINRA, Inc. v. Fiero, 882 N.E.2d 879, 881-82 (N.Y. 2008).
15 U.S.C. § 78aa.
Fiero, 660 F.3d at 579.
Id. at 574.
Id. at 577.
Id. at 578.

138. Id.
139. Id. at 579 (stating that "the NASD improperly designated the 1990 Rule Change, it was
never properly promulgated and cannot authorize FINRA to judicially enforce the collection of
its disciplinary fines").
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C. Variedand Lightly SupervisedSRO Governance Structures
Governance structures for SROs matter because they influence and
control how SROs behave. An SRO with leadership unaccountable to the
public may not react to matters of public concern or feel any significant
pressure to act in the public's interest.
SROs employ a range of governance structures with varying degrees
of public input in the composition of an SRO's senior leadership. While
the public sometimes has a degree of direct influence over the senior
leadership of an SRO, such as the PCAOB, 140 most SROs operate without
any publicly appointed leadership.
The responsibility for policing SRO governance and performance
belongs to the supervising federal agency-if it even has that power.
Notably, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) lacks the
power to specifically require its supervised entities to make governance
changes. 141
Supervising agencies with oversight powers struggle to keep effective
watch over SROs. Often, federal resources are simply spread too thin.
Unsurprisingly, the SEC has failed to closely supervise SRO governance
in the past. 14 2 The SEC has also faced criticism for failing to identify any
way of evaluating whether its supervision of an SRO was effective. 143
Supervising SROs presents a significant challenge for federal
regulatory agencies because SROs differ significantly from each other,
and their governance structures take many forms. There are three
different versions to consider: SROs with public appointments and
removal; nonprofit SROs without public appointments or removal; and
corporate for-profit SROs.
1. Public Appointments & Removal
Although not the norm, some SROs have senior leadership directly
appointed by public officials. For instance, PCAOB offers a relatively
rare example of an SRO with senior leadership directly appointed by a
public agency. The SEC appoints the members of the PCAOB's
governing board after consulting with the Treasury and the Federal

140. The Board, PUB. Co. ACCT. OVERSIGHT BD., https://pcaobus.org/about/the-board
[https://perma.cc/PX6X-KFRG] (explaining that "[t]he five members of the PCAOB Board . .
are appointed . .

by the Securities and Exchange Commission").

141. See Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp. v. FERC, 372 F.3d 395, 403-04 (D.C. Cir. 2004).

142. A 2012 Government Accountability Office Report found that the SEC had "conducted
limited to no oversight of . . FINRA's ... governance and executive compensation." U.S. GOV'T
ACCOUNTABILITY

OFF.,

GAO-12-625,

IMPROVE SEC'S OVERSIGHT
143.

SECURITIES REGULATION:

OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO

OF THE FINANCIAL INDUSTRY REGULATORY AUTHORITY 7 (2012).

See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-376, SECURITIES REGULATION: SEC

CAN FURTHER ENHANCE ITS OVERSIGHT PROGRAM OF FINRA 15 (2015).
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Reserve. 144 When Congress created the PCAOB, it sought to protect its
independence and insulate board members by providing that a "member
of the Board may be removed by the Commission from office . .. for
good cause shown before the expiration of the term of that member." 145
Congress's attempt to insulate PCAOB leadership from political
control led to a constitutional problem because the Supreme Court
believed it created two layers of protection for the PCAOB's
leadership. 14 6 First, the Supreme Court accepted the unclear proposition
that cause was required to remove the SEC Commissioners. 147 Then, the
Supreme Court declared the PCAOB's "good cause" provision
unconstitutional in Free Enterprise Fund because it believed the
PCAOB's leadership to be doubly insulated. 148 Writing for a divided
Supreme Court, Chief Justice Roberts framed the core issue as whether
the "President [may] be restricted in his ability to remove a principal
officer, who is in turn restricted in his ability to remove an inferior officer,
even though that inferior officer determines the policy and enforces the
laws of the United States[. ]" 149 Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that
"such multilevel protection from removal is contrary to Article II's
vesting of the executive power in the President." 150
2. Nonprofits Without Public Appointments or Removal
In contrast to the removal provisions held unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court in Free EnterpriseFund and because it overly insulated
SRO leadership from presidential control, most SROs select their own
leadership without any public appointment process.15 1 In many instances,
members of the SRO's industry will elect a certain portion of the
governing board, and the board itself will appoint additional "public"

144. See 15 U.S.C.

§ 7211(e)(4), invalidatedby Free Enter. Fund v. Pub.

Co. Acct. Oversight

Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 492 (2010) (noting that the SEC "after consultation with the Chairman of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Secretary of the Treasury, shall appoint
the chairperson and other initial members of the Board, and shall designate a term of service for
each").
145. Id. § (e)(6).
146.

See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 505 (reasoning that "the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is

highly unusual in committing substantial executive authority to officers protected by two layers
of for-cause removal").
147. Id. at 486.
148. Id. at 484.
149. Id.

150. Id.
151. See,

e.g.,

NAT'L

FUTURES

ASS'N,

ARTICLES

OF

INCORPORATION

art.

VII,

https://www.nfa.futures.org/rulebook/rules.aspx?RuleID=ARTICLE%20VII&Section=2

[https://perma.cc/8ZFD-W6EE] (providing for a board of directors with a mix of industry and
"public" representatives where the public representatives are selected by the existing board).
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representatives to the board. 152 Thus the only way for a person to join the
board of directors without the approval of the existing board is to be voted
onto the board through the industry election process. In theory, these
board-appointed "public" representatives will counterbalance industry
voices and encourage the SRO to act in favor of the public's interest. 153
As an entity, the SRO is often simply organized as a nonprofit
corporation.1 54
Yet this type of appointment process has long been a concern because
it allows the industry to have substantial influence over the "public" voice
on the SRO's board. Notably, the Massachusetts Securities Division
argued in 2007 that FINRA would be "fundamentally flawed if the
representatives of investors are chosen directly or indirectly by the
securities industry or the current" self-regulatory associations. 155
Over time, this early concern proved prescient as SROs have drawn
criticism for appointing industry members to Public Governor
positions. 156 For example, one 2017 review found that FINRA's "Public
Governors often came to the posts after long industry careers at
influential Wall Street firms." 15 7 As recently as 2017, several of FINRA's
Public Governors simultaneously served on FINRA's governing board
152. See Letter from Thomas W. Sexton, III, Vice President and Gen. Couns., Nat'l Futures

-

Exch., to Jean A. Webb, Sec'y, Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n (Jan. 23, 2006) (on file
with the National Futures Association) (stating that "NFA's Board has always had public
representatives, and their participation is an important protection for those market participants
primarily retail customers and other end users - who are not otherwise represented on NFA's
board").
153. Edwards, supra note 10, at 585-86 ("A key premise underlies the decision to appoint
to the board public representatives, who must bring something different to the board than industry
members-otherwise their appointment would serve no purpose. Ideally, public representatives
zealously guard the public's interest and counterbalance industry influence within self-regulatory
organizations.").
154. See About FINRA, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/about [https://perma.cc/5439-K2UR]

("FINRA is a government-authorized not-for-profit organization that oversees U.S. brokerdealers.").
155. Comment Letter from William F. Galvin, Sec'y, Commonwealth of Mass., to Nancy
M. Morris, Sec'y, SEC (Apr. 18, 2007) (on file with the Commonwealth of Mass.),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-nasd-2007-023/nasd2007023-73.pdf

[https://perma.cc/5BUD-

4JPV] ("We specifically recommend that bodies like the North American Securities
Administrators Association, the American Association of Retired Persons, and the Consumer
Federation of America be among the investor advocates who select the Public Governors .... ").
156. Susan Antilla, FinanceExecs Fill "Public"Board Seats at Finra, the Regulator That
Promises
Investor
Protection,
STREET
(Aug.
26,
2016,
9:31
AM),

https://www.thestreet.com/opinion/finance-execs-fill-public-board-seats-at-finra-the-regulatorthat-promises-investor-protection-13684706 [https://perma.cc/55ET-8UNZ].
157. Andrew Stoltmann & Benjamin P. Edwards, FINRA Governance Review: Public
Governors Should Protect the Public Interest, 24 PUB. INVS. ARB. BAR Ass'N Bus. J. 369, 382
(2017) (manuscript at 10), https://piaba.org/system/files/2017-11/PIABA%20Report-%20FINRA

%20Govemance%20Report%20%28November/2015%2C%202017%29.pdf
H4NA-DD8G].

[https://perma.cc/
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and the boards of entities either overseen by FINRA or those distributing
financial products through FINRA's member firms. 158 To its credit,
FINRA has reduced the degree to which Public Governors concurrently
serve on the boards of entities with subsidiaries overseen by FINRA.
The tendency to appoint industry members with significant industry
connections as "public" representatives to SRO boards is not unique to
FINRA. The NFA also appoints "public" members with significant
industry connections. 159 Public Governors with some industry experience
may be well-situated to understand and appreciate complex issues unique
to their industry. Still, any court reviewing and considering the
constitutional implications of an SRO's governing board should look past
a simple "public" designation and seek to understand the extent to which
"public" members have personal interests aligned with their SRO's
industry.
FERC also supervises its own class of SROs, known as Regional
Transmission Organizations (RTOs), which also operate as nonprofits.16 1
These entities employ varied governance structures, but most design "a
complex arrangement of shared power between an independent board and
RTO members, who jointly hold power over a plethora of grid
management decisions."161 California's RTO stands apart because
California's governor appoints its governing board with approval from
the senate. 162 This unique governance structure, more akin to the PCAOB
than to FINRA, may explain why California's RTO has more vigorously
responded to the climate crisis than less publicly accountable RTOs. 163
Employing the SRO model for electric power likely entrenches
existing market participants and drives negative externalities. One
scholar explained that the SRO structure for governing the electric grid
has led to heel-dragging in the face of the climate change crisis with
voting power at RTOs being employed to "bias market rules" in favor of
existing coal and natural gas infrastructure. 164

158. Benjamin Edwards & Andrew Stoltmann, Financial Regulator's Conflicts of Interest
are a Serious Concern, HILL (Dec. 8, 2017, 1:00 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/

363941 -financial-regulators-conflicts-of-interest-are-a-serious-concern [https://perma.cc/2YDVC5NP] (pointing out that multiple "public governors now take money from financial services
firms" by serving on their boards of directors while simultaneously serving as public governors
on FINRA's board).
159. See Board of Directors, NAT'L FUTURES

Ass'N

https://www.nfa.futures.org/

about/board-of-directors.html [https://perma.cc/CJQ8-NKG3].
160. See Shelley Welton, Rethinking Grid Governance for the Climate Change Era, 109
CALIF. L. REV. 209, 227 n.105 (2021) (explaining that all but one RTO is organized as a nonprofit

and the one that is not formally a nonprofit operates as one).
161. Id. at 228.

162. Id. at 229-30.
163. See id. at 268.
164. Id. at 241, 255.
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3. Corporate For-Profit SROs
Although many SROs were once organized as cooperatives or private
clubs, many now operate as for-profit corporations. 165 This
organizational structure creates a conflict that a for-profit SRO's board
must manage-balancing between the duties owed to shareholders of the
corporation and their duties as an SRO.
Consider the complexities presented by the Intercontinental
Exchange, Inc., a publicly traded company whose shares trade on the
NYSE-one of multiple SROs it owns. 166 Its operations include twelve
"regulated exchanges," including five securities exchanges, six clearing
houses, a broad variety of options and futures, as well as others. 167 CME
Group, another for-profit corporation, also operates a significant number
of exchanges.16 1
Global markets depend on corporate for-profit SROs' steady
functioning. ICE Clear Credit, an SRO and one of Intercontinental
Exchange's subsidiaries, has been designated by the FSOC as a
"systemically important financial market utility." 169 This reflects FSOC's
recognition that ICE Clear Credit's "failure of or a disruption" could
create liquidity and credit problems of such a scale as to "threaten the
stability of the financial system of the United States." 170
A single private corporation may own many SROs and operate them
subject to limited restrictions. The Intercontinental Exchange's
shareholders elect its board of directors. 171 Its annual report explains that
no single person can cast more than ten percent of the votes on any
matter. 172 Similarly, because the Intercontinental Exchange owns SROs,
no person may own "more than 20% of the then outstanding votes entitled
to be cast on any matter" without express board and SEC approval. 173
165. Johnson, supra note 67, at 204 ("[E]xchanges and clearinghouses have traditionally
been organized as cooperatives or private clubs.").
166. Intercontinental Exchange, Inc., Annual Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the

Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 for the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2020 (Form 10-K)
5

(Feb.

4,

2021),

https://s2.q4cdn.com/154085107/files/docfinancials/2020/q4/ICE-4Q20-

JOK.pdf [https://perma.cc/GZ35-PLUR] (explaining that its business segments "includes the
New York Stock Exchange and other registered securities exchanges").
167. Id. at 5-6.

168.

CME GROUP INC., ANNUAL REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION

13

OR 15(D) OF THE

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 2020 (FORM

10-K) 5 (Feb. 26, 2021), http://investor.cmegroup.com/static-files/74ffld56-ab37-4631-b975-

443ce75d19a5 [https://perma.cc/4QLF-WWYR] (describing its business operations).
169. Intercontinental Exchange, Inc., supra note 166, at 16.
170. 12 U.S.C. § 5462(9).
171. See Intercontinental Exchange, Inc., Notice of 2021 Annual Meeting and Proxy
Statement 1, https://dl8mOp25nwr6d.cloudfront.net/CIK-0001571949/79bd3461-Off5-4810-

b0el-09477c01c034.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MJY-XF56].
172. Intercontinental Exchange, Inc., supra note 166, ex. 4.26, at 1.
173. Id.
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The board members controlling for-profit corporations that own SROs
still owe duties to the corporation and to their shareholders. As a
Delaware corporation, the duties owed by the Intercontinental
Exchange's board of directors to the corporation and its shareholders are
defined by Delaware law. 17 4 As one Delaware jurist explained, the
directors of a Delaware for-profit corporation owe an obligation "to
promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of its
stockholders." 17 5
Operating SROs creates unique risks and complexities for private
companies. The Intercontinental Exchange warns that owning and
operating "exchanges exposes [private companies] to additional risks,
including the regulatory responsibilities to which these businesses are
subject." 176 Those risks and responsibilities include the need to enforce
listed company compliance with SRO listing standards and the need to
enforce compliance with SRO rules and the "federalsecurities laws."177
For-profit SROs cannot simultaneously maximize shareholder value
while exercising regulatory power in a way aimed at maximizing the
public's interest and vigorously enforcing the federal securities laws. 178
Speaking candidly, the Intercontinental Exchange's annual report
specifically explains that the "for-profit exchanges' goal of maximizing
stockholder value might contradict the exchanges' regulatory and selfregulatory responsibilities." 179
D. Nonconstitutional, TheoreticalJustificationsfor SROs
Different rationales have been offered to support delegating
governmental authority to SROs. Whatever the merits of these positions,
the reasons to support SRO structures generally have little to no bearing
on their constitutional status.
1. Possible Taxpayer Savings
Using SROs as the primary regulators of their industries may result in
taxpayer savings, depending on how such savings are calculated. One
supporter of industry self-regulation explained that because SROs "are
member-funded, . . . U.S. taxpayers . . . don't pay a dime for self-

174. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 26 (Del. Ch. 2010).
175. Id. at 34.
176. Intercontinental Exchange, Inc., supra note 166, at 24-25.

177. Id. (emphasis added).
178. See SEC, supra note 55, at 71,263 (recognizing as an inherent conflict "that the profit

motive of a shareholder-owned SRO could detract from proper self-regulation").
179. Intercontinental Exchange, Inc., supra note 166, at 25.
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regulation. The market participants themselves do." 180 Generally,
member firms pay fees to their SRO to support its operations and fund its
oversight and enforcement of industry rules. Overseeing entire industries
requires a significant amount of money. In 2021, the largest SRO,
FINRA, budgeted to expend over $1.1 billion and employ over 3,700
people-nearly as many as the SEC. 181 If the SEC were to even attempt
to directly assume all SRO responsibilities, it would require an enormous
congressional spending authorization and would multiply the SEC's
budget and size.
The taxpayer savings rationale, as a justification for industry selfregulation, suffers from real weaknesses. Having an industry bear the
financial burden of its own regulation does not require giving the industry
control over its regulation. Congress could achieve the same effect and
concentrate the cost of an industry's regulation on the industry by
creating a federal regulator with the authority to impose fees on the
industry. The Fair Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) oversees critical
parts of the housing industry and funds its operations from fees assessed
on the entities it supervises.18 2 In 2020, the FHFA collected over $300
million from the entities it oversaw. 183
Industry-funded self-regulation may also drive other costs for the
general public, potentially well in excess of the purported taxpayer
savings. Self-regulating industries have a strong incentive to shape
developing industry rules in ways that maintain higher fees and
transaction costs.1 84 After all, the fees paid by the public create revenue
for industries. 185

180. Heath P. Tarbert, Chairman & Chief Exec., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n,
Remarks of Chairman Heath P. Tarbert on Self-Regulation at Northwestern University's Brodsky
Family JD-MBA Lecture (Nov. 9, 2020), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony
/opatarbert5 [https://perma.cc/T957-MSLN].
181. FINRA, FINRA 2021 ANNUAL BUDGET SUMMARY 5, 8 (2021), https://www.finra.org/
sites/default/files/2021-05/2021_annual_budgetsummary.pdf [https://perma.cc/TNM8-QJRB].

182. 12 U.S.C. § 4516(a) (directing that the FHFA "Director shall establish and collect from
the regulated entities annual assessments in an amount not exceeding the amount sufficient to
provide for reasonable costs (including administrative costs) and expenses of the Agency").
183.

See FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 24 (2020),

https://www.fhfa.gov/AboutUs/Reports/ReportDocuments/FHFA-2020-PAR.pdf [https://perma.
cc/S37G-V4RC].
184. See Kathryn Judge, Intermediary Influence, 82 U. CHI. L. REv. 573, 577 (2015)

("[I]ntermediaries often have expertise and other strategic advantages that enable them to affect
the processes through which institutions evolve in self-serving ways.").
185. Id.
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2. SRO Stability & Independent Funding
Stability and funding concerns provide other nonconstitutional
justifications for industry self-regulation. SROs set their own fee levels
and do not depend on the congressional appropriation process.186 This
also means that when the federal government shuts down because no
appropriation has been passed, SROs continue to function without
interruption. As a result, markets do not cease operating merely because
the SEC had to furlough its staff during a government shutdown because
Congress refused to authorize the SEC to spend funds.
3. Access to Superior Industry Expertise
Often, the SRO model draws support on the theory that regulators lack
the depth of understanding necessary to efficiently regulate certain
markets. In contrast, industry members have a ready depth of expertise
and will not implement unworkable regulations because they lack
understanding about the industry. 18 7
This rationale does not provide a constitutional justification for
relying on SROs to enforce federal laws. Moreover, it calls into question
the ability of federal administrative agencies to effectively oversee SROs.
If federal regulators lack the necessary depth of expertise to understand
markets, they cannot discern whether proposed SRO regulations operate
in the public's interest or simply allow industry members to capture more
transactional fees for themselves without any corresponding public
benefit.
E. Systemic Risk from Courts DisruptingSRO Functioning
Our economic system depends on the steady functioning of many
SROs. Federal law already recognizes that certain SROs serve as
financial market utilities, meaning that their "failure of or a disruption"
could create liquidity and credit problems of such a scale as to "threaten
the stability of the financial system of the United States." 188 As Supreme
Court decisions may disrupt SRO functioning, the possibility of an
adverse Supreme Court decision stands as a largely unappreciated
systemic risk to the global economy.

186. Tarbert, supra note 180 ("SROs avoid the appropriations process, and that's really
important because when your appropriations for a regulator are subject to budgets, to larger
political questions, to members of Congress having to vote for it, oftentimes you end up with
uneven funding and uncertainty.").
187. See Birdthistle & Henderson, supra note 7, at 55 ("[T]he greatest single benefit that

self-regulation possesses . . . is its access to direct industry expertise.").
188. 12 U.S.C. § 5462(9).
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Systemic risk can be challenging to precisely define. 189 The term is
ordinarily understood to describe some disruption creating a domino
effect of adverse economic consequences, materially impairing
markets. 190 These risks can originate from either inside or outside of the
financial system. For example, the 2008-2009 financial crisis came from
within the financial system, driven by defaults on subprime mortgages. 19 1
Systemic risk may also be understood as something that disrupts either
critical financial institutions or markets. 192 In the SRO context, the
Supreme Court poses systemic risk both to SROs as financial institutions
and markets.
1. Potential Direct Disruption to Financial Institutions
An adverse Supreme Court decision invalidating some SRO rule or
activity could directly disrupt critical financial institutions if it interferes
with an SRO's ability to continue ordinary operations. Although the
precise details of these challenges will vary, a challenge to a financial
market utility could immediately destabilize markets. Consider the
critical role played by one SRO-the Depository Trust and Clearing
Corporation (DTCC). DTCC subsidiaries include multiple systemically
important clearing firms. 193 If a market participant successfully
challenged a clearing firm decision on the ground that the clearing firm
rules were unconstitutional, markets may cease to function. If clearing
firms were not able to clear trades, enormous downstream consequences
would ensue. People would not be able to buy or sell securities or
derivatives. Consequentially, all of the wealth stored within these
financial products would become suddenly inaccessible.
Although this type of decision appears unlikely in the near term, its
possibility illustrates how some judicial decision disrupting SRO
functioning could immediately shut down markets and drive disastrous
economic consequences. The point is not that judicial disruption to a
financial institution is likely to happen in any particular way but that the
risk of a judicial decision disrupting a systemically important financial
institution exists.
How much disruption a decision will cause may not be clear
beforehand. Our financial system operates through a series of

189. Barnali Choudhury, Climate Change as Systemic Risk, 18 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 52, 57

(2021) ("Systemic risk lacks a widely accepted definition.").
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Schwarcz, supra note 11, at 198-201.
193. See Paolo Saguato, The Ownership of Clearinghouses: When "Skin in the Game" Is
Not Enough, the Remutualization of Clearinghouses, 34 YALE J. ON REGUL. 601, 612-13 (2017)

(describing systemically important clearinghouses).
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interconnected financial intermediaries. 19 4 A court decision disrupting a
deeply connected SRO will likely generate consequences for all its
connections. As the effects of a disruption ripple outward, a disruption to
one SRO or a piece of market infrastructure may cause a particular asset's
price to crash. 195
As there may be no good way to statistically forecast the likelihood of
a Supreme Court decision directly disrupting a systemically important
SRO, the situation may involve Knightian uncertainty. This means that
probabilities simply cannot presently be assigned to the likelihood of this
type of imaginable event. 19 6
Still, this does not mean that the risk should be ignored. Given the
tremendous size of the potential harm, any relatively modest measure to
mitigate the risk with no or limited downside should be carefully
considered.
2. Potential Market Disruption
The Supreme Court may also disrupt markets by invalidating some
SRO rules or their structures. This type of market disruption may be much
more likely to occur because the event triggering a market disruption may
not be readily foreseeable by Supreme Court Justices. Consider the risks
flowing from a challenge to rules issued by the MSRB. 197 MSRB Rule
G-30 prohibits brokers and securities dealers from buying or selling a
municipal security "except at an aggregate price (including any mark-up
or mark-down) that is fair and reasonable." 1 9 8 A brokerage penalized
under this rule might raise constitutional objections about the rule's
vagueness and contend that they should be able to freely buy and sell
municipal securities at prices their customers willingly accept. If the
Supreme Court invalidated the rule and much of the MSRB's authority,
it would raise significant questions about other MSRB rules, including
those governing the initial offering of municipal securities. Banks might
reasonably suspend or dramatically restrict municipal securities issuance
for a time to resolve the legal uncertainty about such offerings in the
aftermath of such a decision.

194. Tom C.W. Lin, Infinite FinancialIntermediation, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 643, 661
(2015) ("If the financial network is the ultimate intermediary, then every link in that network may
be crucial to its stability.").
195. For example, a temporary outage for Bloomberg terminals once disrupted bond markets.
Nathaniel Popper & Neil Gough, Bloomberg Data Crash Puts Market in Turmoil, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 18, 2015, at B1.

196. See Cass R. Sunstein, Maximin, 37 YALE J. ON REGUL. 940, 944 (2020) (describing
Knightian uncertainty).

197. Municipal securities are often bonds issued by states and local governments.
198. MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BD., RULE G-30(A) (May 14, 2018), https://msrb.org/Rulesand-Interpretations/MSRB-Rules/General/Rule-G-30 [https://perma.cc/7WAB-ESZA].
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This type of market disruption could have catastrophic consequences.
In 2020 alone, the U.S. municipal bond market issued over $484 billion
in long-term municipal bonds. 199 If municipalities could not obtain
capital through these new bond offerings, they might default on existing,
expiring bonds. Widespread bond defaults could trigger large insurance
payments, thus potentially bankrupting insurance companies. State and
local governments in need of capital to fund their operations in advance
of tax revenues might either not be able to obtain them to pay wages or
be forced to accept such unfavorable terms, forcing them to lay off
employees. In short, the potential economic damage from a market
disruption would be enormous.
A Supreme Court decision invalidating an SRO rule, risks triggering
a cascade of market consequences. These risks may be particularly
pronounced for SRO rules connected to securities offering processes. The
sudden invalidation of one of these rules could suspend much of the
activity within capital markets, leading to significantly broader economic
problems.
Critically, the U.S. economy largely depends on the smooth
functioning of capital markets. In 2020 alone, U.S. capital markets issued
over $12 trillion in fixed income products, including mortgage-backed
securities, corporate bonds, treasury securities, municipal bonds, and
asset-backed securities, among others. 20 0 Equity issuances in 2020 totaled
at $390 billion. 20 1 Any disruption to these markets could drive a cascade
of economic problems.
II. LOOMING CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE SRO MODEL

Recent judicial decisions and changes in the composition of the
Supreme Court amplify the risk that federal courts may declare the SRO
model unconstitutional. The constitutional risks now faced by SROs
come from a variety of constitutional quarters grouped into four
categories for this Article: nondelegation doctrine risks; separation of
powers risks; state action risks; and Appointments Clause risks.
Although this Article highlights the risks that these doctrines pose, it
does not attempt to definitively resolve these questions or provide a
perfectly balanced depiction on the relative merits of each doctrine.
Entire law review articles have been written about each of these
doctrines-generally with no attention to what these doctrines mean for
SROs. As SROs remain most prominent in financial regulation,
constitutional and administrative law scholars rarely discuss them.
199.

SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS. ASS'N, 2021 CAPITAL MARKETS FACT BOOK
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https://www.sifma.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/CM-Fact-Book-2021-SIFMA.pdf

perma.cc/Y9JW-7G9V].
200. Id.
201. Id.
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Sketching these risks underscores the present need to thoughtfully
plan for the way that financial regulation will endure and ensure smooth
market functioning if courts decide to roll back SRO authority and reach.
In discussing these doctrines and arguments, this Article does not
focus on whether the Supreme Court would be correct to declare SROs
unconstitutional or otherwise limit their reach. Indeed, many of these
doctrines and arguments have been roundly criticized. Instead, this
Article takes the doctrines as the Supreme Court has stated them and
extends them to highlight the real and foreseeable risks emerging from
these doctrines. Ultimately, some judicial intervention into the SRO
model seems reasonably likely simply because of the awkward middle
ground between business and government now occupied by SROs.
A. Nondelegation DoctrineRisks
Putting the hot disputes over the nondelegation doctrine's existence
and precise reach to the side, the doctrine can be summarized in a general
way. The nondelegation doctrine limits Congress's ability to delegate its
legislative powers and cedes the right to make "legislative" decisions to
others. 202 Proponents of the doctrine point to the Constitution's Vesting
Clause in Article I, which provides that "[a]ll legislative powers herein
granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States." 203 This Clause
has been interpreted as anchoring the legislative power with Congress
and limiting Congress's ability to delegate it away. 20 4
Many conservative and originalist jurists have increasingly turned to
the nondelegation doctrine in their opinions. 205 There will likely be many
more nondelegation challenges and decisions to come because an
expanded nondelegation doctrine could force a conclusion, as Justice
Elena Kagan observed, that "most of Government is unconstitutional
dependent as Congress is on the need to give discretion to executive
officials to implement its programs. "206 Although the shoe has not yet
dropped, a majority of today's Supreme Court has signaled an interest in
revisiting and possibly expanding the doctrine. 20 7
202. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interringthe NondelegationDoctrine, 69 U.

CHI. L. REV. 1721, 1721 (2002).
203. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
204. See Alexander Volokh, The Shadow Debate over Private Nondelegation in DOT v.
Association of American Railroads, 2015 CATO SuP. CT. REV. 359, 360 ("[T]he Supreme Court
agrees with the soundness of the doctrine in principle and has long accepted the nondelegation
reading of the Vesting Clause .... ").
205. See, e.g., Texas v. Rettig, 993 F.3d 408, 409 (5th Cir. 2021) (Ho, J., dissenting)

("[Constitutional] provisions do not permit Congress to delegate its lawmaking powers elsewhere,
any more than they permit the President to delegate the power to sign legislation.").
206. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2130 (2019).
207. See Coney Barrett, supra note 46, at 265 (noting that "the constitutionality of

delegation ...is not likely immune from judicial review").
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However, sketching the boundaries of the nondelegation doctrine
presents a real difficulty because opinions vary widely about the doctrine.
Some opinions claim the doctrine does not exist. 208 Other opinions
contend that the Founders saw no limit on Congress's ability to delegate
power. 209 Yet another opinion provides that "evidence of Founding-era
political thought and practice is overwhelmingly in favor of a
nondelegation doctrine at the Founding." 2 10
Although expanding the nondelegation doctrine poses a risk to SROs
and administrative agencies generally, the private nondelegation doctrine
poses a particular and heightened risk to SROs. It prohibits Congress
from delegating its legislative powers to create binding law to a private
organization. 21 1 This restriction, if applied to SROs, would entirely
prohibit using the SRO model to regulate vast industries.21 2
1. General Nondelegation Doctrine
Establishing the contours of the nondelegation doctrine remains
difficult. The Supreme Court has a history of stating that "Congress
cannot delegate legislative power to the President." 2 13 At the same time,
the Supreme Court has said that Congress may task the executive branch
with implementing statutes. 214 The nondelegation doctrine draws the line
between merely implementing that which Congress directed the
executive to do and that which Congress may not impermissibly delegate.
The nondelegation doctrine's high-water mark came in 1935 when the
Supreme Court struck down two New Deal-era provisions included in the
National Industrial Recovery Act. 215 In PanamaRefining Co. v. Ryan, 2 16
the Court declared a provision allowing the President to set quotas on
how much oil could be transported unconstitutional. 217 Similarly, in
208. See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 202, at 1721 ("[W]e argue that there is no such

nondelegation doctrine .... ").
209. Julian Davis Mortenson & Nicholas Bagley, Delegation at the Founding, 121 COLUM.
L. REV. 277, 332 (2021) ("Regulatory delegations were limited only by the will and judgment of

the legislature.").
210. Ilan Wurman, Nondelegation at the Founding, 130 YALE L.J. 1490, 1556 (2021).
211. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936) (opining that legislative

delegation to a private party is the "most obnoxious form" of delegation).
212. See Hammond, supra note 1, at 1721-22.
213. See Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892) ("[C]ongress cannot

delegate legislative power to the President .... ").
214. E.g., Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2123 (2019) ("Congress may 'obtain[]

the assistance of its coordinate Branches'-and in particular, may confer substantial discretion on
executive agencies to implement and enforce the laws." (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488
U.S. 361, 372 (1989))).
215. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541-42 (1935);
Panama Refin. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430 (1935).
216. 293 U.S. 388 (1935).

217. Id. at 430.
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A.L.A. Schechter PoultryCorp. v. UnitedStates,218 the Court struck down
a provision granting the President power to approve "codes of fair
competition" generated by trade associations on worker hours, minimum
wages, and other issues such as how live poultry may be sold.2 19
These two major nondelegation doctrine decisions came at a time
when the Supreme Court had been sharply limiting congressional power
to regulate interstate commerce. 220 When the Supreme Court reversed its
course on the Commerce Clause in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 2 2 1 the nondelegation doctrine largely receded as well, despite the
doctrine's analytical distinction from commerce clause analysis. 2 2 2 The
Supreme Court has mostly left the nondelegation doctrine slumbering
since that time. In 2000, Professor Cass Sunstein described the
nondelegation doctrine as having had "one good year, and 211 bad ones
(and counting)."

223

For the most part, delegations of legislative authority have been
upheld following J. W Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. UnitedStates.22 4 In essence,
all that is required for a court to uphold the delegation of legislative power
is for Congress to prescribe an "intelligible principle" to guide
regulation. 225 At times, the Court has upheld even seemingly vague
"intelligible principle[s]" such as the "requisite to protect the public
health," which serves as the statutorily articulated, intelligible principle
guiding regulation under the Clean Air Act. 2 2 6
But the doctrine appears poised for a resurgence. Professors Julian
Davis Mortenson and Nicholas Bagley recently warned that the
doctrine's "reinvigoration would mark a radical break with constitutional
practice and could entail the wholesale repudiation of modern American
governance." 227 For years, conservative and originalist scholars
contended that nondelegation doctrines should play a more expansive
role in shaping government structure. 228 Second Circuit Judge Douglas
H. Ginsburg described the nondelegation doctrine as "banished for

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

295 U.S. 495 (1935).
Id. at 535, 541-42.
Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 209, at 284.
301 U.S. 1 (1937).
Id. at 36-37; Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 209, at 284.
Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 322 (2000).
276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
Id.
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 473-76 (2001).
Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 209, at 278.
See Gary Lawson, Delegation and OriginalMeaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 335 (2002)

(" [T]hose who reject a meaningful nondelegation doctrine ... should not pretend to speak in the
name of the Constitution.").
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standing in opposition to unlimited government." 2 2 9 He noted that the
memory of the doctrine is "kept alive by a few scholars who labor on in
the hope of a restoration." 23 0
The odds of the nondelegation doctrine resurging in some form have
increased with new Trump-era appointments to the Supreme Court
joining existing conservative Justices. Justice Samuel Alito recently
signaled his willingness to revisit the existing nondelegation doctrine in
Gundy v. United States 23 1 so long as a majority of Justices could be
assembled to reconsider the doctrine. 2 32 Justice Neil Gorsuch, joined by
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Clarence Thomas, would have struck
the statute down as delegating too much policymaking power to the
executive. 23 3 Although he did not participate in Gundy, Justice
Kavanaugh later signaled that he would support reconsidering the
existing nondelegation doctrine. 2 3 4
A revitalized nondelegation doctrine could create trouble for financial
regulators generally and the SRO regulatory model, particularly.
Consider the statutory provision allowing the SEC to require
nonmembers to comply with securities exchanges' rules. The statute
provides that the SEC may order, "as it deems necessary or appropriate
in the public interest and for the protection of investors," that
nonmembers comply with exchange rules. 2 35 There are many similar
provisions scattered throughout the securities laws enabling the SEC or
SROs to act or make rules "in the public interest." 23 6 The SEC may even
amend SRO rules whenever it believes an amendment would be "in
furtherance of the purposes of' the statutory chapter.237 Whether "in the
public interest and for the protection of investors" or to advance
"statutory purposes" will suffice as an intelligible principle will depend
on how the Supreme Court frames the nondelegation doctrine going
forward. If the Supreme Court narrows the range of permissible

229. Douglas H. Ginsburg, DelegationRunning Riot, 18 REGUL. 83, 84 (1995) (reviewing
DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOw CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE

THROUGH DELEGATION (1993)), https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/
1995/1/v18n1-9.pdf [https://perma.cc/8TFR-GHRS].

230. Id.
231. 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019).
232. Id. at 2131 (Alito, J., concurring) ("Ifa majority of this Court were willing to reconsider
the approach we have taken for the past 84 years, I would support that effort.").
233. Id. (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
234. See Paul v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 342, 342 (2019) (mem.) (Kavanaugh, J., respecting

the denial of certiorari) (stating that Justice Gorsuch's "scholarly analysis of the Constitution's
nondelegation doctrine in his Gundy dissent may warrant further consideration in future cases").
235. 15 U.S.C. § 78f(f).
236. See, e.g., id. § 78o-11(c)(1)(G); id. § 78o-9(d)(1); id. § 78q-1(b)(2).
237. Id. § 78s(c).
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delegations, SROs and other financial regulators may lose substantial
authority.
2. The Private Nondelegation Doctrine & SROs
As generally understood, the private nondelegation doctrine differs
from the more general nondelegation doctrine in that it turns on the
recipient of Congressional legislative power. While some delegations to
government agencies might pass muster under the nondelegation
doctrine, giving the same authority to a private person may violate the
Constitution.
Understanding the private nondelegation doctrine's threat to SROs
requires an understanding of its history. The doctrine originated in Carter
v. Carter Coal Co.2 38 Congress passed a statute authorizing the creation
of district boards to set minimum prices for coal. 2 39 To encourage
participation in the regulatory regime, Congress also enacted a tax that
would apply to anyone opting out of the coal-pricing regulatory
regime.24 The regime called for industry boards, comprised of significant
producers and mine workers, to control maximum hours and to set
minimum prices. 2 41 In many ways, this arrangement appears remarkably
similar to the SRO model allowing industry groups to regulate
themselves.
The Supreme Court declared the arrangement unconstitutional
because it conferred power on the majority of coal producers and miners
acting through the industry board-to regulate the minority. 2 4 2 An oftquoted portion of the decision described this arrangement as "legislative
delegation in its most obnoxious form." 243 It explained that it was an
unconstitutional delegation "to private persons whose interests may be
and often are adverse to the interests of others in the same business. "244
The Supreme Court described this arrangement as an "unconstitutional
interference with personal liberty and private property," "clearly
arbitrary," and "a denial of rights safeguarded by the due process clause
of the Fifth Amendment." 245
Although the decision has been classified by others as part of the
general Lochner-era line of commerce clause cases, this is not the best
238. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
239. Id. at 282.

240. Id. at 289 (explaining that the purpose of the "tax" was "to coerce what is called an
agreement-which, of course, it is not .. .. One who does a thing in order to avoid a monetary
penalty does not agree; he yields to compulsion precisely the same as though he did so to avoid a
term in jail.").
241. Id. at 310-11.
242.
243.
244.
245.

Id. at 311.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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reading. 246 One scholar recently explained that the decision is best
"understood as a constitutionally rooted concern about fundamental
fairness." 2 47 Allowing self-interested private groups to enforce their will
as law on others goes directly to fundamental fairness concerns. 2 4
This concern about whether granting federal power to private actors
is fundamentally fair remains today. About a decade ago, the D.C. Circuit
applied the private nondelegation doctrine to declare a statute delegating
power to Amtrak unconstitutional. 249 On appeal, the Supreme Court
reversed and remanded the decision, finding that Amtrak was a federal
actor, thus removing the concern under the private nondelegation doctrine
about delegating power to Amtrak.2 so
Justice Alito concurred with the decision in Department of
Transportationv. Association of American Railroads251 but went on to
criticize another apparent violation of the private nondelegation doctrine
within the statute.252 A provision of the statute calls for an arbitrator to
decide if the Federal Railroad Administration and Amtrak are in deadlock
over regulatory standards. 2 53 Justice Alito declared that if the arbitrator
might be a private person, the law would be unconstitutional because a
private person would be setting regulatory standards by adjudicating the
dispute.2 54
Justice Alito's concern about a private arbitrator settling disputes
between government branches invoked the private nondelegation
doctrine. He raised the possibility that the structure might allow
government officials to "wield power without owning up to the
consequences . . . by passing off a Government operation as an
independent private concern."255
The SRO model also implicates these concerns. In both instances,
Congress entrusts federal power to private organizations to make rules
governing their industries. SROs generally operate free from
constitutional constraints as private organizations, yet government
agencies often retain the power to shape and control their rules.
246. See, e.g., Edward Cantu, Seila Law as Separation-of-PowersPosturing, 110 GEO. L.J.
ONLINE 38, 42 (2021) (describing Carter Coal as the Supreme Court acting with

"uncompromising formalism [to strike down] federal laws passed pursuant to the Commerce
Clause").
247. See Hammond, supra note 1, at 1722.
248. Id. at 1722-23.
249. Ass'n of Am. R.Rs. v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 721 F.3d 666, 677 (D.C. Cir. 2013),
vacated, 575 U.S. 43 (2015).
250. See Ass'n ofAm. R.Rs., 575 U.S. at 44.
251. 575 U.S. 43 (2015).
252. Id. at 56-57 (Alito, J., concurring).
253. Id. at 59-60.
254. Id. at 60-61.
255. Id. at 57.
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Moreover, the SEC may even use its power to amend an SRO's rules with
the statute deeming an SEC-enacted SRO rule "to be part of the rules of
[the SRO] and . .. not . .. considered to be a rule of the [SEC]." 256
Yet SRO-style delegations have thus far escaped the private
nondelegation doctrine. In response to Carter Coal, Congress directed
industry groups to "propose" coal prices to a federal agency. 257 The
agency would then approve, disapprove, or otherwise modify the
proposal. 25 8 In Sunshine Anthracite Coal v. Adkins, 259 the Supreme Court
approved this new arrangement.260 The Court found that Congress had
not "delegated its legislative authority to the industry" because the
industry boards "function subordinately to the Commission." 26 1 This
arrangement passed muster because the federal agency held ultimate
approval power. 2 62 The Supreme Court embraced the same reasoning in
Currin v. Wallace, 263 where federal regulations would only become
effective if two-thirds of tobacco growers voted in favor of it. 264 A federal
regulator created the regulations, leaving the industry vote as a mere
procedural hurdle.
Functionally, the private nondelegation doctrine is dead letter as long
as some federal agencies retain formal oversight power. 265 Even though
audited SROs wield vast power, they meet this requirement because
federal agencies retain the ability to approve or disapprove SRO
rulemaking and to review their adjudications.
A Supreme Court more concerned about excessive delegations of
legislative power to private entities might revisit this highly deferential
approach. As Professor Emily Hammond explained, this formalistic
approach does not speak to the kind of oversight that should be required
or "whether the oversight is sufficient to guard against arbitrariness or
promote accountability."266
The Supreme Court might view oversight differently depending on
how an SRO proposal goes into effect. SRO rule proposals go into effect
in different ways. The SEC may affirmatively approve or disapprove
256.

15 U.S.C.

§ 78s(c)(4)(C).

257. Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 388 (1940) (describing the
scheme).
258. Id.
259. 310 U.S. 381 (1940).

260. Id. at 404.
261. Id. at399.
262. Id.
263. 306 U.S. 1 (1939).

264. Id. at 15 ("Congress has merely placed a restriction upon its own regulation by
withholding its operation as to a given market 'unless two-thirds of the growers voting favor it."').
265. See Hammond, supra note 1, at 1728 ("[C]ases reflect an on-off approach that asks

only whether the privatization at issue is subject to formal oversight by a federal agency.").
266. Id.
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many rule proposals. If the SEC fails to affirmatively disapprove of or
respond to a rule proposal after a set period, the statute deems the SEC to
have approved the rule proposal. 267 Some rule proposals become
immediately effective upon filing if the SRO characterizes them as
meeting particular criteria, such as interpreting an existing SRO rule,
modifying fees, or involving the administration of the SRO. 2 68 Of course,
the SEC retains the power to immediately suspend effective rules
afterward if it deems such action necessary. 2 69
A private nondelegation doctrine challenge to SROs, rooted in due
process principles, might also attract a majority of the current Supreme
Court. Notably, the modern SROs, overseen by the SEC, operate under a
different regulatory framework than they did in the New Deal era. The
SEC now has the power to amend SRO rules on its own. 270 A due process
challenge might succeed by focusing on the impropriety of allowing a
federal authority to shed its restraints and regulate through a private
entity.271

B. Separationof Powers Risks
In recent years, the Supreme Court has increasingly applied separation
of powers principles to find various facets of the administrative agency
design unconstitutional. 272 Although not explicitly articulated in the
Constitution, separation of powers principles arise from the
Constitution's structure situating different powers within different
branches of government. 273 Notably, the Constitution places "[t]he
executive Power . . . in a President of the United States of America,"
directing the President to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed."

274

To protect the President's ability to ensure faithful execution of the
laws, the Supreme Court issued several decisions invalidating the
administrative agency structures that overly insulate the heads of
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

15 U.S.C. § 78s(b).
Id.
Id.
See supra Section I.A.
See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., The PrivateDelegation Doctrine,73 FLA. L. REV. 31, 75 (2021)

("The Due Process Clause protects the public against the federal government's attempt to shed
those rules by delegating power to private parties, whether individuals or corporations.").
272. See Kristin E. Hickman, Symbolism and Separation of Powers in Agency Design, 93
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1475, 1476 (2018) ("Administrative law has seen several cases in recent

years focused on agency design and separation of powers principles.").
273. See Metro. Wash Airports Auth. v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501
U.S. 252, 272 (1991) (explaining that the Framers "disperse [d] the federal power among the three
branches-the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial-placing both substantive and
procedural limitations on each").
274. U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 1, 3.
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administrative agencies from presidential control. As most SROs entirely
control their own personnel without any line of appointment to the federal
executive, these decisions have increased the degree of uncertainty about
modern SROs.
A substantial body of caselaw discusses the need to ensure that the
President retains an appropriate degree of administrative control over the
persons enforcing federal law by preserving the presidential power to
remove officials. 27 5 For instance, in Myers v. United States,276 the
Supreme Court recognized that the President must have the power to
remove senior executive branch officials to maintain control over the
government.2 77 Since that time, only a few exceptions to this general rule
have been affirmed by the Supreme Court.
Independent federal administrative agencies have been somewhat
insulated from presidential removal power through for-cause removal
provisions. The Supreme Court first approved a statute providing
officials at a multimember, independent agency with for-cause removal
protection in Humphrey Executor v. United States27 8 in 1935.279 For
decades, the precedent had been understood to authorize for-cause
removal protections for the heads of independent agencies.
In recent years, the Supreme Court has rendered opinions limiting the
conditions under which an independent agency may be insulated from
executive control. In 2020, the Supreme Court revisited the issue in Seila
Law LLC v. Consumer FinancialProtectionBureau, and declared the forcause removal protection provided to the Bureau's head
unconstitutional. 28 0 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts ruled that
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau's (CFPB) for-cause removal
protections were unconstitutional because, unlike the other multimember
executive agencies, the CFPB wields "significant executive power and is
run by a single individual." 28 1 The Court found the structure
unconstitutional because it overly inhibited the President's ability to
ensure the faithful execution of the law. 2 82 The Court treated the
limitation as severable from the rest of the statute and left the CFPB
otherwise intact.

275. See generally Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (ruling that the president has

the power to remove executive branch officials).
276.
277.
278.
279.

272 U.S. 52 (1926).
Id. at 134-35.
295 U.S. 602 (1935).
Id. at 629.

280. 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2192 (2020).
281. Id.
282. Id. at 2204.
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1. Implications for SROs from Collins v. Yellen
A year after the Seila Law opinion was released, the Court used the
same reasoning in Collins v. Yellen and struck down another for-cause
removal protection for the single director head of the FHFA. 2 83 Increasing
the danger to SROs, the Court explained that the President's "removal
power serves vital purposes even when the officer subject to removal is
not the head of one of the largest and most powerful agencies." 2 84 Justice
Alito's majority opinion also stressed that the President must maintain a
"degree of control" over subordinates, and that the removal power works
to ensure that subordinates "serve the people effectively and in
accordance with the policies that the people presumably elected the
President to promote." 285 Notably, the reasoning in Collins explicitly
rejected a number of possible distinctions which might have been used to
save an SRO facing a constitutional challenge.
a. Size & Scope Immaterial
The Court in Collins specifically rejected attempts to distinguish the
FHFA from the CFPB based on its size and scope. 286 While the CFPB
regulates a broad range of consumer financial products and affects purely
private individuals, the FHFA only directly oversees a limited range of
government-sponsored entities. This distinction did not matter in Collins.
Justice Alito, writing for the majority, explained that courts should not
"weigh the relative importance of the regulatory and enforcement
authority of disparate agencies," and that the Court did "not think that the
constitutionality of removal restrictions hinges on such an inquiry."2 87
This language may make it more difficult for SROs to distinguish
themselves by situating themselves as playing narrow roles.
b. Rejecting Public/Private Distinctions
Creating even more danger for SROs, Justice Alito also rejected a
proposed public/private distinction. An amicus argued that by acting as a
receiver, the FHFA stepped into the shoes of a private entity, thus not
wielding executive power.28s Justice Alito rejected this distinction with
language directly relevant to SROs. He explained that when the FHFA
decides "what it must do, what it cannot do, and the standards that govern

283. Collins v. Yellen, 141 S. Ct. 1761, 1784 (2021) ("A straightforward application of our
reasoning in Seila Law dictates the result here.").
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1785.
Id.
Id.
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its work," it necessarily interprets federal statutes. 289 Quoting Bowsher v.
Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986). Justice Alito found that "interpreting a law
enacted by Congress to implement the legislative mandate is the very
essence of 'execution' of the law." 290
Justice Alito's reasoning creates real risks for SROs because they also
interpret laws enacted by Congress. Under this standard, the
Intercontinental Exchange and similar SROs execute the law because
they must enforce compliance with the provisions of the Exchange Act
and a range of other rules and regulations. 29 1 This means that
longstanding, SRO-led enforcement efforts may face a new degree of
constitutional scrutiny because they require SROs to interpret and
implement federal law. SROs charged with enforcing federal law may
now struggle to use their private status to avoid constitutional issues.
c. Rejecting "Indirect" Regulation Arguments
Justice Alito also rejected an attempt to distinguish the FHFA from
the CFPB on the ground that it only regulated a narrow class of special
entities.292 Justice Alito, in rejecting this distinction, explained that the
"President's removal power serves important purposes regardless of
whether the agency in question affects ordinary Americans by directly
regulating them or by taking actions that have a profound but indirect
effect on their lives." 29 3
In a future case, SROs might seek to differentiate themselves by
pointing out that their regulations and oversight primarily affect their
members and not the general public. Justice Alito's opinion recognized
that, even if specialized business entities are the direct and primary targets
of regulation, regulatory decisions go on to affect ordinary people. For
example, consider the SROs overseeing electric grids. Their decisions
about the types of infrastructure to develop and maintain has a significant
impact on ordinary people. Similarly, decisions about how to enforce
federal law for financial services firms have a significant impact on the
types of services provided to ordinary retail investors.
d. Split over Relief
The Supreme Court's conservative majority split over whether the
FHFA's prior actions were lawful because its director held office under
the protection of an unconstitutional provision. The majority, including
Justice Alito, simply remanded the question to evaluate whether the

289.
290.
291.
292.
293.

Id.
Id. (quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733 (1986)).
Intercontinental Exchange, Inc., supra note 166, at 16-17.
Collins, 141 S. Ct. at 1786.
Id.
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unconstitutional for-cause removal provision caused any compensable
harm. 294
Justice Gorsuch's concurrence charted a different path and indicated
that he would have declared all the FHFA's director's prior acts void.29 5
He speculated that the majority may have been hesitant to award relief
because "affording a more traditional remedy here could mean unwinding
or disgorging hundreds of millions of dollars that have already changed
hands." 2 96
If the constitutionality of an SRO reaches the Supreme Court, Collins
shows the difficulty the Court will face in awarding relief. Declaring the
SROs prior acts unlawful will likely be unappealing because it might
unwind trillions of dollars in transactions. Remanding the issue to lower
courts would also likely launch a flood of litigation if nonparties rush to
court to unwind transactions. If the Supreme Court followed the path
Justice Gorsuch advocated for and voided a critical SRO, it would likely
trigger a financial crisis.
2. Office of Legal Counsel Extends Collins
After Collins, the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel
issued an opinion applying the decision to the head of the Social Security
Administration (SSA). 297 It found that President Biden could simply
remove the head of the SSA, notwithstanding the existence of a statutory
for-cause removal provision. 298 It also found the inclusion of the
unconstitutional tenure protection provision did not affect the remainder
of the statute as Justice Alito did in Collins.299
3. Situating FreeEnterpriseFund
Although predating Collins and Seila Law, Free Enterprise Fund
stands as one of the most critical precedents for understanding how the
Supreme Court may rule when considering a challenge to the SRO
regulatory model. 300 The case involved a challenge to a provision of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which granted for-cause removal protection to
persons appointed to the PCAOB by the SEC. 301 Despite the absence of

294. Id. at 1789.
295. Id. at 1799 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
296. Id.

297. Constitutionality of the Commissioner of Social Security's Tenure Protection, 45 Op.
O.L.C., slip op. at 1 (July 8, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/olc/file/1410736/download
[https://perma.cc/HY3H-ZR9S] ("The President may remove the Commissioner of Social
Security at will notwithstanding the statutory limitation on removal.").
298. Id.
299. Id. at 15.
300. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 514 (2010).

301. Id. at 486.
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any statutory provision explicitly providing for for-cause removal for
SEC Commissioners, the Supreme Court has treated the structure as
creating a double layer of for-cause removal protections. 30 2 In the
majority's view, the double layer of protection rendered the structure
unconstitutional on separation of powers grounds because it stripped the
President of the power to ensure the faithful execution of law.303
Professor Nagy predicted this outcome five years before the Supreme
Court decided Free Enterprise Fund when she explained that "the
oversight provided by the formally independent SEC cannot plausibly be
expected to function as a presidential surrogate."3 04
Free Enterprise Fund is notable because the PCAOB sits within a
grey area between a government agency and an SRO. In creating the
PCAOB, Congress declared that it "shall not be an agency or
establishment of the United States Government," and that persons
working for the PCAOB shall not "be deemed to be an officer or
employee of or agent for the Federal Government by reason of such
service. "305 These provisions make the PCAOB resemble an SRO.
Despite the statute declaring the PCAOB not part of the government, it
also provides for PCAOB board members to be appointed by the SEC.3 06
In his opinion declaring the PCAOB's for-cause removal protections
unconstitutional, Chief Justice Roberts distinguished the PCAOB from
the NYSE, contending that it differed because the PCAOB "is a
Government-created, Government-appointed entity, with expansive
powers to govern an entire industry." 307 These distinctions may not
survive skeptical scrutiny in light of the core rationale behind Free
Enterprise Fund-the need to protect the President's power to ensure the
faithful execution of the laws.
a. Government-Created v. Government-Authorized
As others have recognized, drawing a constitutional line based on
whether Congress created a corporation to wield government power or
simply authorized a corporation to register and wield government power
makes little sense. 30 8 Although SROs generally obtain their entity status
through state corporate charters, they derive their power and authority
from federal law. 309 SROs often enforce federal law, promulgate
302. See Gary Lawson, Stipulating the Law, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1191, 1193-94 (2011).
303. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 496-97.
304. Donna M. Nagy, Playing Peekaboo with Constitutional Law: The PCAOB and Its
Public/PrivateStatus, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 975, 1056 (2005).
305. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7211(b), invalidated by Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. 477.
306. Id. § 7211(e).
307. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 485.
308. See McLaughlin, supra note 21, at 112.

309. Id.
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regulations, enjoy power over their industries because federal law
mandates membership, and may even be subject to having their rules
modified by federal administrative agencies. 3 10 In many instances, SROs
also enjoy absolute immunity from suit when exercising their regulatory
powers. 3 11
Drawing a constitutional line between whether these entities are
government-created entities or government-authorized entities does not
relate to the core concern animating FreeEnterpriseFund.3 12 Whether an
entity is chartered under state law or is federally created has no bearing
on whether the President is "stripped of the power . . . and his ability to
execute the laws-by holding his subordinates accountable for their
conduct." 3 13 The precise method of creation of an SRO does not relate to
the underlying separation of powers concerns. 3 14
b. Government-Appointed v. Privately Appointed
Chief Justice Roberts also distinguished the PCAOB from the NYSE
on the ground that government officials appoint the directors of the
PCAOB. 3 15 In contrast, the Intercontinental Exchange, the NYSE's
parent company, has its own board of directors elected by its
shareholders. Of course, Chief Justice Roberts's reference to the NYSE
could also be taken to refer to FINRA, a nonprofit corporation with a
board comprised of industry-elected and board-appointed members. 3 16
This distinction may not hold under functionally oriented scrutiny and
a direct challenge. The way senior leadership comes to hold a position at
an SRO has little relevance to whether the SRO wields government
power. Indeed, the way SRO officials take power may create significant
Appointments Clause issues. 3 17
Of course, the Supreme Court might also continue to see privately
appointed leadership as a significant distinction. To the extent that an
SRO's operations remain entirely privately funded with privately
appointed leadership, the Supreme Court might treat this fact as cutting

310. See supra Section II.A.

311. Standard Inv. Chartered, Inc. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 637 F.3d 112, 115 (2d
Cir. 2011) ("There is no question that an SRO and its officers are entitled to absolute immunity
from private damages suits in connection with the discharge of their regulatory responsibilities.").
312. See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 496-97.
313. Id. at 496.

314. Id.
315. Id. at 484-85.
316. FINRA emerged in 2007 after the NASD merged with a regulatory arm of the NYSE.
Nancy Condon & Herb Perone, NASD and NYSE Member Regulation Combine to Form the
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority - FINRA, FINRA MEDIA CTR. (July 30, 2007),
[https://perma.cc/4YHY-53XA].

317. See infra Section II.D (discussing Appointments Clause issues).
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against recognizing that the SRO operates as a part of the federal
government.
c. Expansive Powers to Govern an Entire Industry
Chief Justice Roberts also distinguished the PCAOB from the NYSE
by pointing out that the PCAOB had "expansive powers to govern an
entire industry.""' This seemingly differentiates the PCAOB, which
regulates the accounting profession, from the NYSE, which regulates its
member firms.
This distinction may not hold for many SROs because federal law
often requires entire industries to join an SRO. 3 19 A person cannot operate
a futures firm without joining the NFA. Similarly, any brokerage must
join FINRA. 320 When federal law compels membership in an SRO, the
SRO achieves the functional power to regulate the entire industry. As
SROs also possess the power to make immediately effective rules, they
possess expansive power to affect their industries.32 1
To be sure, federal regulators retain real power and oversight authority
over industries regulated by SROs. In most instances, federal regulators
will affirmatively approve SRO rules before they take effect. 322
Regulators also retain the power to invalidate SRO rules. 32 3 However,
just because federal regulators retain power over SROs does not mean
that the SROs themselves lack expansive powers over their industries.
Practically speaking, some SROs are substantially larger and more
expansive than the PCAOB. Consider the differences between the
PCAOB and FINRA. In 2020, the PCAOB had total operating expenses
of $264.9 million. 32 4 The PCAOB's inspectors reviewed 219 different
audit firms out of a total of 1,726 PCAOB-registered public accounting
firms. 32 5 In contrast, FINRA expended $1,155.1 million in 2020.326
FINRA oversees over 600,000 registered brokerage firm representatives

318. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 485.
319. SEC, GUIDE TO BROKER-DEALER REGISTRATION (Apr. 2008), https://www.sec.gov/

reportspubs/investor-publications/divisionsmarketregbdguidehtm.html [https://perma.cc/RZ9CBWD6].

320. Id.
321. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(3).
322. See Hammond, supra note 1, at 1736.
323. Id.
324. PUB. CO. ACCT. OVERSIGHT BD., 2020 ANNUAL REPORT 28 (Apr. 27, 2021),

https://pcaob-assets.azureedge.net/pcaob-dev/docs/default-source/about/administration/documents
/annual-reports/2020-annual-report.pdf?sfvrsn=581231fi_5 [https://perma.cc/9FBB-XN5K].
325. Id. at 3, 8.
326. FINRA, 2020 FINRA ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT 8, https://www.finra.org/sites/

default/files/2021-06/2020-annual-financial-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/88LM-DMAV].
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for over 3,400 member firms.3 2 7 In 2020, it conducted over 1,200 cycle
examinations for member firms. 3 2 8 FINRA is substantially larger than the
PCAOB and rivals the SEC in size.
Although some SROs may be larger than the PCAOB, the Supreme
Court has already declared that it sees evaluating the size and scope of a
regulatory agency irrelevant for separation of powers purposes. Chief
Justice Roberts joined Justice Alito's opinion in Collins, which instructed
that courts should not "weigh the relative importance of the regulatory
and enforcement authority of disparate agencies. "329
Ultimately, the constitutional status of SROs was not before the Court
in Free Enterprise Fund. Chief Justice Roberts's passing distinction
between the PCAOB and an SRO, spanning just thirteen words, will
likely be characterized as dicta in a future case, putting the issue squarely
before the Supreme Court.
C. State Action Risks
SROs might find much of their power and reach curtailed if the
Supreme Court ultimately declares many of their enforcement activities
to be state action. Using SROs as frontline regulators changes
enforcement because SROs can do things federal regulators cannot when
they enforce federal law. An SRO may permanently bar someone from
its industry simply for refusing to answer questions that might incriminate
them. Federal agencies could not impose such a penalty for simply
asserting Fifth Amendment rights. 33 0 SROs also enjoy the power to
enforce seemingly vague rules which would likely be unenforceable by
federal agencies. 33 1
Courts applying state action doctrine might substantially limit SROs.
Although private entities are generally free to manage their affairs as they
see fit, they must respect constitutional rights when their actions are
"fairly attributable" to the government. 33 2 For example, the Supreme
Court has found that Amtrak "is an agency or instrumentality of the
United States for the purpose of individual rights guaranteed against the
Government by the Constitution." 333

327. Statistics, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/media-center/statistics#key [https://perma.cc/
TVJ8-CPTR].
328. Id.

329. Collins v. Yellen, 141 S. Ct. 1761, 1785 (2021).
330. See United States v. Solomon, 509 F.2d 863, 869 (2d Cir. 1975) (finding that an SRO,

compelling a member to answer questions in the SRO's investigation, does not violate the Fifth
Amendment because the SRO is not a state actor); see also Jones v. SEC, 115 F.3d 1173, 1183
(4th Cir. 1997) (same).
331. See supra text accompanying notes 89-94.
332. See Hammond, supra note 1, at 1729.
333. Lebronv. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 394 (1995).
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In many instances, SRO activities appear fairly attributable to the
government.33 4 Federal law often requires industry members to join an
SRO. 3 35 Federal law often then compels SROs to enforce federal law. 336
Government agencies often even have the power to amend the SRO's
own rules. 337 In this context, an SRO's rules may never truly be entirely
its own because it issues its rules with governmental approval and in the
shadow of the government's power to demand amendments to its rules.
For some matters, SROs even successfully assert sovereign immunity
when challenged in court.338
Scholars and commentators have debated the issue, and some have
concluded that SROs should be deemed state actors. 339 Others have urged
against increasing federal control over SROs because it would likely turn
them into state actors. 34 0 A Supreme Court decision declaring SROs to be
state actors would generate substantial problems for SROs and would
require them to provide due process in their investigations and to respect
the constitutional rights of their members. Such a decision would also
substantially impede an SRO's ability to enforce vague rules to capture
objectionable conduct.
For the most part, courts have found that SROs are not state actors.
Consider one leading case, Desiderio v. National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc. 341 Susan Desidero received a job offer from a
bank to work as a securities broker.342 Her employment offer depended
on registering with the NASD (now FINRA). 34 3 Because registering with
the NASD required her to sign an arbitration agreement, Desidero

334. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982) (explaining when actions

may be fairly attributed to the government).
335. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(8).
336. See Stone & Perino, supra note 98, at 463 ("[T]he compulsion for SROs to perform

enforcement activities and the delegation of law enforcement functions to the SROs ... suggests
that SROs should be viewed as state actors when enforcing federal law.").
337. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c).
338. See, e.g., Standard Inv. Chartered, Inc. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 637 F.3d

112, 115 (2d Cir. 2011) ("There is no question that an SRO and its officers are entitled to absolute
immunity from private damages suits in connection with the discharge of their regulatory
responsibilities.").
339. Michael, supra note 60, at 197 ("Although courts have difficulty with the threshold
question of state action in some instances, self-regulatory organizations clearly are so acting."
(footnote omitted)); Stone & Perino, supra note 98, at 463; Michael Deshmukh, Note, Is FINRA
a State Actor? A Question that Exposes the Flaws of the State Action Doctrine and Suggests a

Way to Redeem It, 67
340.
341.
342.
343.

VAND.

L. REV. 1173, 1178-80 (2014).

Karmel, supra note 12, at 196-97; Birdthistle & Henderson, supra note 7, at 54.
191 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 1999).
Id. at 200.
Id.
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challenged the requirement because it forced her to waive her
constitutional rights to access federal courts and a jury trial. 344
The Second Circuit rejected Desidero's constitutional argument
because it found that the NASD was not a state actor. 34 5 The court
described the NASD, instead, as a private actor not funded by the
government. 346 It also noted that no statute requiredthe creation of the
NASD and that the government did not appoint any NASD official. 347 It
pointed out that the Second Circuit had previously ruled that the NYSE
was not a state actor in a case decided in 1975.348
The Second Circuit also rejected an attempt to classify the specific
decision requiring securities brokers to agree to arbitration as state
action. 34 9 The Second Circuit found that there was no evidence that the
SEC required or pressured the NASD to adopt its arbitration policies. 3 50
The SEC's approval of the registration form requiring mandatory
arbitration was not sufficient to make the specific requirement to
surrender constitutional rights constitute state action. 35 1 The analysis did
not assign great significance to federal law requiring persons to join the
SRO. 352
Whether a supervising federal agency pressures an SRO to take a
particular regulatory path may be unknowable. Private individuals often
have no means of obtaining communications between SROs and their
supervising federal agencies. 353 As SROs are generally deemed private
organizations, freedom of information and public records laws do not
apply to them. 354 At the same time, records of the SEC's supervision of
SROs may not be obtainable under freedom of information laws. 3 55
Predicting when courts will declare SRO actions to be state actions
remains difficult. 356 Older precedents declaring SROs to be private actors
may carry less force today after significant amendments to federal law
increasing government control over and entanglement with SROs. As
these changes have eaten away at the underlying rationales for the early

344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.

Id.
Id. at 206.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing United States v. Solomon, 509 F.2d 863, 867-71 (2d Cir. 1975)).
Id. at 207.

350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. See Pub. Invs. Arb. Bar Ass'nv. SEC, 771 F.3d 1, 2 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
354. See id.

355. See id. at 7 ("[W]e hold that documents the Commission collects while examining
financial institutions-that is, while examining any organization the agency regulates-are
exempt from disclosure.").
356. Hammond, supra note 1, at 1729-30.
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decisions, lines of decisions finding SROs to be private actors may be
vulnerable to reconsideration.
Notably, the Second Circuit rendered its Desiderio decision without
briefing on the impact of the 1975 amendments to the federal securities
laws, which gave the SEC the ability to edit an SRO's rules at its will.
The court also did not consider the requirements that SROs enforce
federal securities laws. These issues were not raised in Desiderio's
opening brief 357 Other federal circuits have reached different conclusions
when considering whether and when to classify the SRO's conduct as
government action.358
For persons facing SRO enforcement actions where the SRO seeks to
enforce federal law, whether and when the SRO qualifies as a state actor
carries real significance. If the SRO acts as a private organization,
constitutional rights and protections, such as the right to due process and
the freedom from self-incrimination do not apply. 359 This means that an
SRO may bring an enforcement action for a violation of federal law and
coerce compliance by threatening to forever bar a person from their
profession for any refusal to cooperate. The federal government may then
obtain sworn testimony and statements made in that proceeding and use
it in criminal prosecutions. 360 Some scholars have contended that
constitutional protections should apply when SROs enforce federal law
because federal law requires SROs to enforce federal law.361
Ultimately, the law around when SROs qualify as state actors and
when SROs must provide due process remains unsettled and sometimes
perplexing. Some decisions have declared that the Constitution requires
that SROs must provide due process in certain circumstances. 362 Perhaps,
357. See generally Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, Desiderio v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers,
Inc., 191 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 1999) (No. 98-6100), 1998 WL 34084243 (stating that the underlying

issue is whether the imposition by an industry-wide association of a pre-employment agreement
requiring the arbitration of all employment disputes, including those involving discriminatory
treatment under civil rights laws, is a violation of the affected worker's due process rights).
358. See Blount v. SEC, 61 F.3d 938, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (finding that MSRB rules

operated "not as a private compact among brokers and dealers but as federal law"); R.J. O'Brien
& Assocs., Inc. v. Pipkin, 64 F.3d 257, 262 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding that the NFA acts as a

government actor when it "requires an applicant to agree to submit to the arbitrationrules in order
to register").
359. See United States v. Solomon, 509 F.2d 863, 872 (2d Cir. 1975) (finding that the NYSE

violated a defendant's privilege against self-incrimination by requiring him to answer questions
about violations of federal law to remain within the securities industry).
360. See, e.g., id.
361. Stone & Perino, supra note 98, at 492.
362. Intercontinental Indus., Inc. v. Am. Stock Exch., 452 F.2d 935, 941 (5th Cir. 1971)

("The intimate involvement of the Exchange with the Securities and Exchange Commission
brings it within the purview of the Fifth Amendment controls over governmental due process.");
Rooms v. SEC, 444 F.3d 1208, 1214 (10th Cir. 2006) ("Due process requires that an NASD rule

give fair warning of prohibited conduct before a person may be disciplined for that conduct.").
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to lessen its Desiderioprecedent, the Second Circuit has required some
due process in the form of an impartial adjudicator on a statutory basis.3 63
The Second Circuit also issued an opinion finding an SRO to
simultaneously be a "private actor" while granting it absolute immunity
as exercising a regulatory power.3 64
The Supreme Court may eventually address this issue because courts
have been divided over when SROs are considered state actors. The issue
may also appeal to the Supreme Court because an appeal will present
separation of powers, nondelegation, and Appointments Clause issues.
D. Appointments Clause Risks
SROs also face grave danger from recent Appointments Clause
decisions-one of the major areas of litigation over the constitutionality
of the SEC's adjudicative process. Challenges based on this doctrine may
spill over into the SRO context as well. 365 The Appointments Clause sets
out the methods for appointing "Officers of the United States." 366 It also
limits Congress to three different options for the appointment of "inferior
Officers" of the United States. 3 67 Those options include appointment by
"the President alone," "the Courts of Law," or the "Heads of
Departments."368
A threshold question for Appointments Clause cases is whether a
particular person serves as an "Officer" of the United States, and if so,
what kind. 369 In Buckley v. Valeo,37 0 the Supreme Court explained that
"any appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the
United States is an 'Officer of the United States. ' 37 1 Further, in Morrison
v. Olson,372 the Supreme Court considered four factors to decide whether
an independent counsel appointee was a principal Officer or an inferior

363. D'Alessio v. SEC, 380 F.3d 112, 121 (2d Cir. 2004) ("[W]e think that provision of 'a

fair procedure' in SRO disciplinary proceedings gives rise to a due-process-like requirement that
the decision-maker be impartial.").
364. Santos-Buchv. FINRA, Inc., 591 F. App'x 32, 33-34 (2d Cir. 2015).
365. Cf Alexander I. Platt, SECAdministrativeProceedings:Backlash andReform, 71 Bus.

L. 1, 17 (2015) ("A judicial ruling finding [SEC administrative adjudication] unconstitutional
because the wrong person signed off on their appointment, or because they are entitled to job
protections under the MSPB, would be potentially transformative.").
366. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. See Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168, 1176 (10th Cir. 2016) (" [W]e must consider the

creation and duties of SEC ALJs to determine whether they are inferior officers.").
370. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
371. Id. at 126.
372. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
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Officer.373 Years later, in Edmond v. United States,374 the Supreme Court
also found that "the term 'inferior officer' connotes a relationship with
some higher ranking officer or officers below the President: Whether one
is an 'inferior' officer depends on whether he has a superior." 37 5
In Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 37 6 the Supreme
Court differentiated between whether an official was an "inferior Officer"
or a mere employee. 377 The Court found that the special trial court judges
appointed by the tax court were "inferior Officers" even though they
lacked the power to issue final decisions. 37 8 The Supreme Court first
noted that these special trial court judges held offices prescribed by law
before pointing to their "significant discretion" beyond that of mere
employees. 379 These powers included taking testimony, conducting trials,
ruling on the admissibility of evidence, and enforcing discovery orders. 3 80
After declaring that the Tax Court's special trial judges were "inferior
Officers" for Appointments Clause purposes, the Supreme Court
ultimately upheld the appointment structure by finding that the Tax Court
was a court of law, although not an Article III court. 38 1
The precise test for identifying when a person serves as an "inferior
Officer" of the United States remains somewhat unclear. The Supreme
Court recently spoke to this issue in Lucia v. SEC.382 There, Raymond
Lucia marketed a retirement saving strategy he called "Buckets of
Money." 3 83 The SEC launched an administrative proceeding alleging that
Lucia's marketing and presentations were deceptive. 384 The matter was
assigned to one of the SEC's in-house administrative law judges (ALJs)
appointed by the SEC's staff and not by the presidentially appointed
commissioners. 385 Lucia argued that the ALJ lacked constitutional
authority because he was appointed by the SEC's staff and not the
Commission itself.3 86 Both the SEC and the D.C. Circuit rejected this

373. Id. at 671-72. The Court considered whether: (i) another official could remove the
counsel; (ii) the scope of the counsel's duties; (iii) the counsel's jurisdiction; and (iv) the counsel's
tenure. Id. These factors led the Supreme Court to classify the independent counsel as an inferior
Officer. Id.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.

520 U.S. 651 (1997).
Id. at 662.
501 U.S. 868 (1991).
Id. at 881-82.
Id.
Id.

380. Id.
381. Id. at 891-92.
382. 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018).
383. Id. at 2049.
384. Id.
385. Id. at 2049-50.
386. Id. at 2050.
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argument, finding that the ALJ was a mere employee.3 8 7 The Supreme
Court reversed and applied Freytag'sanalysis to resolve the issue.38 8
Two elements drove this analysis. First, the Supreme Court found that
the ALJs held a "continuing office established by law." 389 This
requirement coheres with the Appointments Clause's language stating
that it applies to officers "whose Appointments are not herein otherwise
provided for, and which shall be established by Law." 39 0 Second, it
considered whether the SEC's ALJs wield significant authority. 39 1 On
balance, the Supreme Court concluded that ALJs possessed as much, if
not more, authority than the Tax Court's special trial court judges already
found to be "inferior Officers." 392 The Supreme Court reversed the D.C.
Circuit's decision with instructions that a different, constitutionally
appointed ALJ should resolve the case. 393
Precisely how courts will apply these precedents to SROs remains
uncertain. 394 Still, after Lucia, the increasingly conservative Supreme
Court has continued to accept Appointments Clause cases. In 2021, a
divided Supreme Court resolved United States v. Arthrex, Inc., 39 5 finding
that the "unreviewable authority wielded by [administrative patent
judges]" is "incompatible with their appointment by the Secretary to an
inferior office." 396 Chief Justice Roberts wrote the majority opinion, with
Justices Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joining in the first two
parts, which found the appointment structure unconstitutional under the
Appointments Clause. 397
The Arthrex opinion included language that may raise the stakes for
SROs in future cases. The Court explained that "power acquires its
legitimacy and accountability to the public through 'a clear and effective
chain of command' down from the President, on whom all the people
vote." 39 8 This concern that persons wielding federal power be
accountable to the President may cause the Supreme Court to question
387. See Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277, 283 (D.C. Cir. 2016), rev'd and
remanded sub nom. Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018), vacated, 736 F. App'x 2 (D.C. Cir.

2018).
388. Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2052.
389. Id. at 2053.

390. U.S. CONST. art. II,
391.
392.
393.
394.

§ 2, cl. 2.

Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2053.
Id.
Id.
Brodsky, supra note 20, at 57 ("[T]here are no bright-line standards for determining

whether someone is an officer, rather than an employee, and therefore must be appointed in
conformity with the Appointments Clause.").
395. 141 S. Ct. 1970 (2021).
396. Id. at 1985.
397. Id.
398. Id. at 1979 (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477,

498 (2010)).
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the independence enjoyed by SROs enforcing federal law. In many
instances, SROs either appoint their own leadership or their shareholders
will elect them. 399
A future Appointments Clause challenge to SROs on Appointments
Clause grounds would likely revolve around two different issues: when
SRO offices are "established by law;" and when SRO officials wield
"significant authority."
1. SRO Offices May Be Established by Law
Thus far, most Appointments Clause challenges have involved
adjudicative offices plainly within federal administrative agencies. Tax
court judges, the SEC's ALJs, and administrative patent judges (APJs)
all occupy statutorily authorized offices. In contrast, an SRO's internal
administrative structure and offices will not ordinarily be statutorily
mandated. This may allow an SRO to argue that its offices are not
"established by law" in the sense of the Appointments Clause.
Yet administrative law often governs how an SRO creates an office.
SROs seeking to make changes to their rules and organizational structure
generally file proposed changes with their supervising agency for
approval. For example, the SEC approved the NASD's decision to
reorganize and merge with the NYSE's member regulation group to
create FINRA. 400
Other laws require that SROs establish offices with particular features.
For example, FINRA formed the Office of Hearing Officers (OHO) to
comply with a federal securities law requirement that it provide a "fair
and impartial procedure" for its discipline and enforcement. 40 1 Hearing
officers admit evidence, rule on motions, render decisions, and impose
sanctions. 402 These offices may be seen as "established by law" either
because of a supervising agency's approval or because of the statutory
requirements to create a fair process.
2. SRO Officials Wield Significant Authority
An Appointments Clause challenge would likely consider the degree
of authority that any particular SRO wields. 403 In many instances, SROs
perform the types of actions often performed by government agencies.
399. See Edwards, supra note 10, at 614-15.

400. Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-56145, 91 SEC Docket
404, 404 (July 26, 2007).
401. Office of HearingOfficers, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/adjudication-

decisions/office-hearing-officers-oho/about [https://perma.cc/L4K8-LLK7].).
402. Id.
403. See, e.g., United States v. Arthrex, Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1970, 1985 (2021) (holding "the

unreviewable authority wielded by APJs during inter partes review is incompatible with their
appointment by the Secretary to an inferior office").
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They promulgate rules, conduct investigations, bring enforcement
actions, enforce and interpret federal law, decide disputes, and issue
sanctions. Given the extensive nature of an SRO's operations, many
facets of its operations will involve significant discretionary authority to
enforce federal law.
The Supreme Court's resolution of Appointments Clause issues in
Free EnterpriseFundmay also shed some light on how it may approach
this issue. 40 4 After first ruling that the PCAOB's for-cause removal
protection was unconstitutional on separation of powers grounds, Chief
Justice Roberts turned to the Appointments Clause issues.405 He found
that the PCAOB's members were "inferior officers whose appointment
Congress may permissibly vest" with the SEC. 406 The governing boards
of SROs occupy functionally similar positions to the members of the
PCOAB. Indeed, the PCAOB was largely modeled on preexisting SROs.
Thus, the Supreme Court may struggle to differentiate them.
III. MITIGATING THE SYSTEMIC RISK FROM THE

SRO MODEL

Collectively, the preceding sections establish that much modern
regulation and economic coordination runs through SROs. 407 They also
demonstrate that SROs now face readily foreseeable threats from judicial
decisions either substantially limiting their reach or declaring their
operations unconstitutional. 4 08 A Supreme Court decision invalidating
significant SRO activity may have consequences for the U.S. financial
system because SROs now play such critical, load-bearing roles. 409
Merely recognizing that the Supreme Court's direction and doctrines
present a systemic risk to the financial system will do little good should
the risk materialize. Many may welcome such a decision because it would
better align the government with their view of the constitutional
framework-even if it triggers a financial crisis. For persons with this
view, the "fault" for a crisis would lie not with the Supreme Court for
invalidating critical market infrastructure but with Congress for erecting
the financial system on an unconstitutional foundation.
Fortunately, foreseeing the risk before it materializes offers an
opportunity to plan for how to reduce the likelihood a crisis will occur
and blunt its impact if this risk arises. This Part presents structural and
litigation management options to reduce risk and options to mitigate the
impact of adverse judicial decisions.

404.
405.
406.
407.
408.
409.

See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 510 (2010).

Id. at 508-10.
Id.
See supra Part I.
See supra Part II.
See supra Section I.E.
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A. StructuralOptions to Reduce Risk
A range of different interventions may reduce the risk that the
Supreme Court would render a decision sharply limiting SRO jurisdiction
and authority. Structural options to reduce this risk steer SROs down two
different paths-either granting them greater independence and reducing
federal administrative agency control or moving them toward greater
integration within the federal chain of command. As a nonstructural risk
mitigation technique, SROs and federal agencies might also work to
manage litigation risk and reduce the likelihood that a court will consider
these issues.
1. Rolling Back Governmentalization
SROs may reduce the likelihood that federal courts will substantially
interfere in their operations by gaining greater independence from federal
oversight. Many of the risks SROs currently face stem from their
federalized role and responsibilities. Congressional legislation and
federal administrative agency rulemaking could combine to reduce the
degree to which SROs now operate as an arm of the federal
government. 4 10

a. Reduce Federal Law Enforcement Responsibilities
A present, federal requirement that SROs enforce federal law may
create risks for SROs on separation of powers, state action, and
Appointments Clause grounds. 411 Removing these federal law
enforcement obligations would reduce the likelihood of federal court
intervention in SRO operations. If SROs did not serve as frontline federal
law enforcement, the need for the President to have greater control over
their operations to ensure the faithful execution of the law would
diminish. 41 2 Similarly, it would become much more difficult to attribute
SRO activities to the federal government and declare them to be state
actors. 4 13 The Appointments Clause risks would also diminish because it
would be less likely that courts would characterize SRO officials as
principal or "inferior officers" for constitutional purposes. 4 14
Yet reducing SRO responsibilities to enforce federal law would also
likely create significant problems. If SROs ceased their federal law
enforcement activities, federal agencies would need to make up for the
410. See Birdthistle & Henderson, supra note 7, at 64.
411. See Stone & Perino, supra note 98, at 463 ("[T]he compulsion for SROs to perform

enforcement activities and the delegation of law enforcement functions to the SROs ... suggests
that SROs should be viewed as state actors when enforcing federal law.").
412. See supra Section IIB.
413. See supra Section IIC.
414. See supra Section IID.

2022 ]

SUPREME RISK

601

shortfall in frontline enforcement. Congress would need to either
authorize substantially larger enforcement and oversight budgets or
accept substantially reduced enforcement. Even if Congress increased
federal enforcement resources, it might impose greater burdens on
industry members. Instead of having a single SRO regularly examining
their operations, industry members would face examinations and
oversight from federal officials and their SRO. On balance, this could
reduce efficiency and significantly increase total compliance and
oversight costs.
b. Reduce Federal Control Over SRO Operations
Another option to distance SROs from the federal government would
be to substantially reduce the degree to which federal agencies control
and oversee SRO operations. For financial SROs, this would likely mean
removing the SEC's ability to amend or issue SRO rules and its ability to
exert control over SRO governance. 41 5
Reducing federal agency oversight over SROs would reduce the risk
that federal courts would declare SROs to be state actors. It would make
it more difficult to classify any particular SRO activity as "fairly
attributable" to a federal government agency. 4 16
Still, reducing federal agency oversight over SROs would also create
risks. Any reduction in federal SRO oversight likely corresponds with an
increased risk that an SRO or its members will frustrate federal policy
objectives or maintain artificially high prices for consumers. 417
Too much reduction in federal oversight for SROs could also create
real risks for SROs under the private nondelegation doctrine. 4 18 SROs
enjoy delegated federal power under the supervision of a federal
administrative agency. If statutory or regulatory changes entirely remove
federal agency supervision and leave SROs with federal power, the
oversight-free delegation would likely be deemed unconstitutional. 419
2. Increased Governmentalization
Another option to reduce judicial risks for SROs is to pull them deeper
into the federal government. By increasing "governmentalization" and
accountability of a public authority, SROs reduce the likelihood that
federal courts will intervene in their operations.
415. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C.A. § 78s(c) (West).
416. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982) (explaining that state action

doctrine requires that actions be "fairly attributable" to government).
417. See Judge, supra note 184, at 614-18 (discussing ways in which financial intermediaries
have influenced regulation to favor rules which give them higher fees).
418. See supra Section II.A.2.
419. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936) (opining that legislative

delegation to a private party is the "most obnoxious form" of delegation).
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a. Federal Appointments Without Removal Protections
Shifting the selection process for SRO leadership may substantially
reduce risks currently faced by SROs. Consider the Supreme Court's
treatment of the PCAOB in Free EnterpriseFund.420 There, the Supreme
Court struck down removal restrictions, which were meant to protect
PCAOB's members, because the restrictions impaired the President's
"ability to execute the laws" because the President could not hold
"subordinates accountable for their conduct" when executing federal
laws. 42 1 Placing SRO leaders within the federal chain of command would
give the President the power to influence SRO operations.
At present, federal agencies have even less control over SROs than
they did over the PCAOB because federal agencies generally do not
appoint any SRO leadership. Changes to appointment and removal
procedures for SRO board members and significant officers would likely
reduce the risk that courts would extend Free Enterprise Fund and
declare an SRO's operations unconstitutional on separation of powers
grounds. This would require substantial changes in SRO governance.
Currently, industry members or shareholders often elect much of an
SRO's leadership. 422 For for-profit SROs, moving to a federal
appointment process for SRO leadership would likely require somehow
severing profit-focused activities from regulatory authority.
Putting federally appointed officials in charge of SROs would take
much of the "self' out of self-regulation. This might increase the risk that
the SRO would act in ways that inflate costs for industry members
because of a lack of industry-specific expertise. This change would also
increase the likelihood that the SRO's activities would be treated as state
action.
b. Respect Constitutional Rights
SROs might also reduce the risk of judicial intervention in their affairs
by guaranteeing due process and protection from self-incrimination to the
targets of their investigations. However, these changes would
undoubtedly raise the SRO's enforcement costs without the ability to
summarily expel members for declining to answer incriminating
questions. 4 23 This approach implicitly recognizes that SRO activities are
"fairly attributable" to the federal government. 424
An SRO might attempt to walk a fine line here and only respect
constitutional rights when enforcing federal law. SROs might still retain
420. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 496 (2010).

421. Id.
422. See Edwards, supra note 10, 614-15.
423. See supra Section I.C.
424. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).
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some flexibility, including the power to summarily expel members when
their investigative questions relate solely to the SRO's rules and not to
other provisions of federal law. Thus, the SRO might seek to retain its
flexibility when acting as a private club while respecting constitutional
rights when acting as de facto federal law enforcement. Of course, SROs
taking this approach would remain vulnerable to courts that are
sympathetic to arguments that federal law compels industry members to
join SROs and surrender to their jurisdiction.
c. Fully Nationalize SROs
Another option to reduce risk would be to fully nationalize existing
SROs and formally bring them within the federal hierarchy. Making
SROs a part of the federal government could be accomplished with a
relatively modest budgetary impact on industry members and federal
agencies. Congress would need to provide for nationalized SROs to retain
their power to set membership fees sufficient to fund their operations.
Indeed, Congress has already implemented this type of structure when
providing for the FHFA to fund its operations by assessing their fees.12 1
Fully nationalizing SROs would also likely force a reduction in SRO
powers. SROs might struggle to enforce vague rules when operating as a
formal part of the federal government. These SROs would also likely
incur higher investigation and enforcement costs because their
enforcement targets would likely be entitled to constitutional protections.
B. Active Measures to Mitigate JudicialRisk
Stakeholders may hesitate to embrace sweeping reforms to either
retreat from governmentalization or fully embrace it without judicial
decisions forcing the issue. At present, SROs often enjoy the best of both
worlds-operating with federal authority and absolute immunity without
constitutional restraints. Fortunately, there are options short of immediate
structural changes which may mitigate judicial risks to the SRO model.
1. Risk Monitoring
If they are not already, federal administrative agencies and SROs
should begin systematically surveilling ongoing cases within the federal
court system to thoughtfully monitor cases where courts might issue
decisions with significant implications for SROs. Notably, SROs face
risk not just from cases where courts consider constitutional challenges
to their own operations but also from cases where courts consider
constitutional challenges to other SROs. For example, a constitutional
challenge to the NFA likely has significant implications for a range of
other SROs with similar features. Monitoring ongoing litigation enables
425. See FED. Hous. FIN.

AGENCY, supra note

183, at 24.
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SROs and federal administrative agencies to launch coordinated
responses to cases presenting judicial risk.
2. Generate Favorable Precedents
Awareness of existing constitutional challenges creates an
opportunity to attempt to persuade courts to render favorable decisions.
When SROs and federal administrative agencies recognize that a pending
action may create adverse or favorable precedent, they may devote more
resources to the matter. For SROs that are not parties to the action, this
may mean that they should hire sophisticated outside counsel to prepare
persuasive amicus briefs to inform and influence the court. For SROs that
are parties to a case presenting a constitutional challenge, they may
allocate additional personnel and resources to the matter to increase the
likelihood of a favorable decision. Additionally, they may coordinate
with other SROs with interests at stake in the matter to bring in additional
support.
Another option may be to attempt to shift cases toward jurisdictions
statistically more likely to generate favorable precedents. Systematic
forum shopping may increase the likelihood of favorable decisions.
3. Avoid Negative Precedents
SROs may mitigate risk by taking steps to reduce the likelihood of
courts creating negative precedents. For example, SROs and federal
administrative agencies could simply offer favorable settlement deals
whenever a well-resourced litigant raises constitutional challenges to the
SRO structure. This could reduce the likelihood that courts would issue
negative decisions.
Of course, this type of settlement strategy suffers from a significant
weakness. If other litigants observe that SROs and administrative
agencies offer unusually generous settlements to litigants raising
constitutional challenges, more litigants will raise constitutional
challenges. Ultimately, these kinds of active efforts to shape the
development of judicial decisions may only slow the rise of adverse
precedent.
C. MitigatingAdverse Decisions
The negative impact of an adverse decision may be substantially
mitigated with sufficient advance planning and preparation. There are
several possibilities for insulating markets from disruption.
1. Contingency Planning
Supervising agencies and SROs should prepare contingency plans for
how to respond to a successful constitutional challenge. Putting these
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types of plans in place may equip SROs and supervising agencies to
mitigate the risk of an adverse decision destabilizing a significant market.
Judicial decisions often provide for time before the decision goes into
effect. SROs with contingency plans for these situations may be better
equipped to swiftly respond and take steps to mitigate damage.
A framework for contingency planning already exists. After the 2008
financial crisis, Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act 426 (Dodd-Frank Act) to address systemic
risk in the financial system and institute other reforms. The Dodd-Frank
Act instructed regulators to require certain systemically important
institutions to prepare contingency plans for their "orderly resolution in
the event of material financial distress or failure." 42 7 While these "living
wills" should not be viewed as "silver bullets" capable of entirely
neutralizing systemic risk, planning for how to respond to a judicial
decision invalidating or severely limiting SRO authority would likely
improve their response. 428
At a minimum, financial regulators should think through and issue
guidance on how to respond in advance to an adverse ruling. In contrast,
waiting until a decision arrives increases the likelihood of a chaotic
response.
2. Contingency Rulemaking & Statutory Authority
SROs and federal administrative agencies may also promulgate rules
or seek the enactment of statutes that could be triggered if the need arises.
For example, statutes or regulations might provide that in the event of a
successful constitutional challenge to the appointment structure for SRO
leadership, the supervising agency may appoint the SRO's governing
board and significant officers. These trigger statutes would avoid any
gaps in SRO functioning and enable a federal administrative agency to
swiftly exercise control over an SRO rendered leaderless by a
constitutional challenge.
Waiting to provide for supplemental authority until after the Supreme
Court or another federal court reaches a decision risks enormous
economic damage to the broader economy. For example, consider the
impact of a ruling that a systemically important SRO operated
unconstitutionally, rendering its actions legally void. If this type of ruling
took a financial market utility offline until Congress acted, a multi-day
delay and political uncertainty could immediately disrupt substantial
economic activity.
426. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5301).
427. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5365(d)(1).
428. See Nizan Geslevich Packin, The Case Against the Dodd-FrankAct's Living Wills:
Contingency Planning Following the Financial Crisis, 9 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 29, 36 (2012)

(explaining the limitations of living wills).
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Of course, courts might take contingency rulemaking and statutes as
an invitation to declare some SRO activities unconstitutional. Some
courts might see preparing for this risk as implicit recognition that SRO
activities now exceed constitutional limits. Others might be emboldened
to reach such a conclusion by the knowledge that a safety net was
constructed to catch financial markets should SROs fall.
On balance, preparing for the risk seems preferable to betting that
courts will refuse to issue decisions that would disrupt financial markets.
Some Justices may see the attendant disruption as a valuable
constitutional lesson. Other Justices may doubt that their decisions could
actually destabilize markets. There can be no certainty that refusing to
prepare for a foreseeable judicial risk will somehow deter federal judges
insulated by life tenure and salary protection.
CONCLUSION

Financial regulators must recognize that the Supreme Court presents
systemic risks to the financial system. Systemically important SROs will
likely face significant constitutional challenges in the near future. Recent
decisions by the majority-conservative Supreme Court have created the
precedent and conditions under which future challenges to SRO authority
will arise. Because an adverse decision could destabilize markets,
regulators and policymakers must carefully consider whether and how to
insulate markets from judicial risk.
Thus far, the SRO model has proved remarkably effective at
insulating markets from politically driven instability. During government
shutdowns and interruptions, financial markets continue operating
largely unimpeded because modern SROs detach market functioning
from Congressional and budgetary politics. Yet, despite SROs largely
avoiding political risk, significant judicial risk to their operations and
markets remains.
Congress, federal regulators, and SROs should prepare for the entirely
foreseeable risk that courts will soon significantly interfere in the SRO
model. Adequate preparation may reduce the likelihood of these risks
materializing through some form of prudential restructuring. In the
alternative, federal regulators must prepare to assume significant SRO
responsibilities should a court declare some significant facets of the SRO
model unconstitutional.

